Abstract
Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the work of grounding a posteriori necessity.
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I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this paper
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LaPorte, J. Rigid Designators for Properties. Philos Stud 130, 321–336 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4676-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4676-5