The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology Article DOI:
Cite this article as: Knobe, J. Philos Stud (2006) 130: 203. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4510-0 Abstract
It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between
intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use. References Adams, F. 1986 ‘Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View’ Mind and Language 1 281 301 Google Scholar
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