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Proxy “Actualism” *

Philosophical Studies volume 129, pages 263–294 (2006)Cite this article

Abstract

Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA

    Karen Bennett

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  1. Karen Bennett
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Correspondence to Karen Bennett.

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* I would like to thank Rae Langton, Jim Pryor, Robert Stalnaker, Ed Zalta, and, especially, an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for very helpful comments. Thanks also to Andrew Cortens, Michael Jubien, and an audience at the ANU for helpful discussion of an early version of this paper.

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Bennett, K. Proxy “Actualism” *. Philos Stud 129, 263–294 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1641-2

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