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Review of THE INNOCENT EYE: WHY VISION IS NOT A COGNITIVE PROCESS, by NICO ORLANDI (Oxford University Press, 2014)

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  1. Exeter, UK

    Ken Pepper

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  1. Ken Pepper
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Correspondence to Ken Pepper.

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Pepper, K. Review of THE INNOCENT EYE: WHY VISION IS NOT A COGNITIVE PROCESS, by NICO ORLANDI (Oxford University Press, 2014). Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 483–488 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9454-2

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