Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 315–335 | Cite as

Distrusting the present

Article

Abstract

We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed in relation to previous research on temporal phenomenology. Finally, we discuss how there may be individual differences in the experience of temporal flow, in particular along the autism spectrum. The resulting view is that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception results from an internal, inferential process.

Keywords

Temporal phenomenology Specious present Prediction error minimization Hierarchical Bayesian inference Autism Binocular rivalry Action Perception 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cognition & Philosophy LabMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia
  2. 2.ARC Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain FunctionClaytonAustralia
  3. 3.School of Psychology, Monash UniversityClaytonAustralia

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