Notes
Siegel 2012, p.34
For instance in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl excludes the evidence of the world’s existence on the basis that “the whole unitarily surveyable nexus…can prove to be an illusion, a coherent dream” (p.57 of the original text). For more on this issue in Husserl and also Heidegger, see McManus 1996.
How the content is entertained varies from one view to another (e.g., see Pautz 2010; Siegel 2012, and Schellenberg 2011). It is also worth noting that is not an intentionalist commitment that perception be indirect. The commitment is to saying that one perceives worldly object (usually directly) by entering a representational state with a certain content, not that one perceives worldly objects by perceiving a representational content.
For more on these differences, see the works cited.
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Ali, R. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 455–460 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9413-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9413-3