Abstract
I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and emotion regulation. However, I register skepticism about a second and more radical form of HEEE.
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Notes
These reports are particularly illuminating since, unlike Moebius Syndrome cases (which are congenital), these individuals are able to contrast the character of their emotional life prior to their impairment with their post-injection experience. See also Cole’s discussion of the loss of emotional experience associated with Bell’s Palsy (Cole 1998)
One might worry that this dependence relation is merely causal, and not genuinely constitutive—whereas the latter is the sort of dependence relation HEC is primarily concerned with (Kirchhoff 2013; cf. Adams and Aizawa 2008). However, since I am arguing that HEBE is not a thesis about genuinely extended emotions, the paper’s central argument remains untouched whether or not bodily information can be said to properly constitute (part of) the associated emotion; in either case, the information (and the emotion) remains agent-bound and is thus non-extended, in my sense of the term. Second, if the bodily information is part of the process that realizes the emotion—it is co-occurrent with the emotion, and its presence (along with other factors) is necessary for the emotion to occur, etc.—it seems at least prima-facie plausible to claim constitutive dependence (see De Jaegher et al. 2010 for further discussion of the distinction between “contextual factors”, “enabling conditions”, and “constitutive elements”). Nevertheless, this is admittedly a complicated issue. I return to it below. My thanks to a referee for pressing this point.
I develop the argument in this section in much more detail in Krueger (2014). What follows is simply a sketch of this longer argument.
Consider a contrast case: congenital amusia, the inability to recognize musical melody, time-changes, or discriminate pitch, despite otherwise normal hearing (Ayotte et al. 2002). In these cases, music is perceived without its accompanying motor potentialities—amusiacs don’t experience music as affording rhythmic engagement; they have marked difficulty synchronizing bodily movements with music, but not non-musical sounds (Dalla Bella and Peretz 2003)—and the phenomenological character of the music-as-heard is altered accordingly. Total amusiacs report that music has a highly disagreeable character, sounding like a screeching car or the cacophonous banging of pots and pans (Sacks 2007, pp. 98–119). Without these motor potentialities, music is experienced not as an environmental resource affording engagement but rather as impenetrable environmental noise.
“Entrainment” is a concept borrowed from complex systems theory. It refers to instances where two or more independent oscillatory processes (e.g., swinging pendulums) synchronize with each other by gradually locking into a common phase and/or periodicity (Will and Turow 2011; Clayton et al. 2005). In this context, I am interested in the way that various neural, behavioral, and affective responses entrain with ongoing patterns of rhythmic signals in music (Phillips-Silver et al. 2010; Bispham 2006).
I return to this point below.
Although see Krueger (2012) for a longer response to C-C.
I am not suggesting that young infants lack self-consciousness or a first-person perspective altogether. Their capacity for visual imitation, for instance, makes it likely that they possess, at minimum, a rudimentary sense of embodied and ecologically situated selfhood (Neisser 1995). Nevertheless, without the ability to exert inner control of attention, it is plausible that an important dimension of self-consciousness is missing and the character of their experience is altered accordingly.
There is, of course, an asymmetry here. While the caregiver’s emotion is (or so I claim) literally part of the infant’s experience, the converse is not true since the caregiver has developed the requisite endogenous mechanisms for “shoring up” their experience and thus rendering it structurally invulnerable to being co-inhabited by others.
See Krueger (2013b) for a longer discussion of this idea.
See Cochrane (2009) for an excellent discussion of joint attention and musical experience.
A reviewer asks if there may high-intensity, emotionally-taxing instances where the inhibitory resources of the group members are weakened to the extent that enter into an affectively vulnerable state similar to that of infants (and thus are poised to realize a collectively extended emotion). If so, this description may be one way to understand the group psychology of a mob situation, say, or the uniform manner by which a group responds emotionally to an especially charismatic speaker. This is an intriguing suggestion. Nevertheless, I have some doubts as to whether these circumstances would be sufficient to realize a collectively extended emotion. While our inhibitory resources can be significantly weakened in extreme case of stress, fatigue, or arousal, endogenous function is generally not lost altogether; even in these limit cases, we don’t become just like infants in the relevant sense. Accordingly, I assume that similar types of individual variability as discussed in the live music example would also apply to these cases. That said, the psychological trauma of prolonged torture might be sufficient to weaken an individual’s (or group’s) inhibitory resources and essentially reduce them to an infant-like state. This possibility is worthy of further consideration.
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I am very grateful to Salomé Jacob, Imke Biermann, Giovanna Colombetti, and Tom Roberts for comments on earlier versions of this essay. Many thanks also to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful critical comments.
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Krueger, J. Varieties of extended emotions. Phenom Cogn Sci 13, 533–555 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9363-1
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