Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 257–274

Neural representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and vitiated verdicts. A reply to Hutto & Myin (2013)


DOI: 10.1007/s11097-014-9350-6

Cite this article as:
Colombo, M. Phenom Cogn Sci (2014) 13: 257. doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9350-6


Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed “the Hard Problem of Content.”


Neural representationalism Hard problem of content Un-metaphysical cognitive science 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tilburg Center for Logic, General Ethics, and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS)Tilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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