Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 459–463 | Cite as

Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition

Article

Keywords

4E Cognition Traditional cognitivism Enactivism Embodied cognition Extended cognition 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of WollongongWollongongAustralia

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