Abstract
How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.
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O’regan, J.K., Myin, E. & NOë, A. Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 369–387 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0