Abstract
I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
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Bickle, J. Replies. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 285–296 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4074-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4074-2