Policy Sciences

, Volume 50, Issue 2, pp 217–239 | Cite as

How can interactions among interdependent structures, institutions, and agents inform financial stability? What we have still to learn from global financial crisis

Research Article

Abstract

How national financial systems can avoid costly banking crises is a persistent and intriguing question for institutional scholars and policymakers worldwide. In this context, although considerable research has recently focused on structural, institutional, and agency-level factors in explaining the global financial crisis, it mostly offered each of these explanatory factors in isolation, thus leaving interactions among these interrelated factors incomplete. Building on a deviant case study on Australian exceptionalism examined in a comparative perspective, this paper introduces an integrative framework that views financial stability as a function of these interactions that reinforce prudent financial behavior. In doing so, it offers an insight into the previous research on institutional complementarity and how to guard against similar crises in the future. It suggests that financial stability (instability) is more likely when interactions among structural and institutional complementarities and agents reinforce conservative (opportunistic) banking.

Keywords

Global financial crisis Structure Institution Agent Bank Regulation Australia Research transparency 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of International Relations, College of Administrative Sciences and EconomicsKoç UniversitySariyer, IstanbulTurkey

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