Advertisement

Natural Hazards

, Volume 89, Issue 3, pp 1461–1483 | Cite as

A review of game theory applications in natural disaster management research

  • Daniel Seaberg
  • Laura Devine
  • Jun ZhuangEmail author
Review Article

Abstract

Research for efficiently planning and responding to natural disasters is of vital interest due to the devastating effects and losses caused by their occurrence, including economic deficiency, casualties, and infrastructure damage. Following the large breadth of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, we observe a growing use of game theoretic models in the research concerning natural disaster management. In these models, government agencies and private companies interact as players in a disaster relief game. Notable research in these areas has studied multi-player games and multi-agency collaboration, among others, to provide insights into optimal decisions concerning defensive investment and private–public partnerships in the face of disaster occurrence. This paper aims to increase the comprehension of game theory-based research in disaster management and to provide directions for future research. We analyze and integrate 57 recent papers (2006–2016) to summarize game theory-based research in natural disaster and emergency management. We find that the response phase of disaster relief has been researched most extensively, and future research could be directed toward the other phases of disaster management such as mitigation, preparedness, and recovery. Attacker–defender games to be utilized relatively frequently to model both mitigation and response for a disaster. Defensive resource allocation and sequential/simultaneous games to model the interaction between agencies/individuals in light of a disaster are two other common ways to model disaster management. In addition to academia, the targeted audience of this research includes governments, private sectors, private citizens, and others who are concerned with or involved in disaster management.

Keywords

Game theory Natural disaster Disaster management Emergency management 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research was partially supported by the United States National Science Foundation (NSF) under award numbers 1200899 and 1334930. This research was also partially supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under award number 2010-ST-061-RE0001. However, any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the NSF, DHS, or CREATE.

References

  1. Adida E, DeLaurentis PCC, Lawley MA (2011) Hospital stockpiling for disaster planning. IIE Trans 43:348–362CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bankston CL III, Barnshaw J, Bevc C et al (2010) The sociology of Katrina: perspectives on a modern catastrophe. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, LanhamGoogle Scholar
  3. Bassett DS, Alderson DL, Carlson JM (2012) Collective decision dynamics in the presence of external drivers. Phys Rev E 86:036105CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Batabyal S, Bhaumik P (2013) Information gradient based content search architecture for mobile opportunistic network. In: 2013 Fourth international conference on computing, communications and networking technologies (ICCCNT), pp 1–8Google Scholar
  5. Bilham R (2010) Lessons from the Haiti earthquake. Nature 463:878–879CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Bouzat S, Kuperman M (2014) Game theory in models of pedestrian room evacuation. Phys Rev E 89:032806CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cameron L, Shah M (2015) Risk-taking behavior in the wake of natural disasters. J Hum Resour 50:484–515CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Castelli T, Lee J, Naqvi W (2006) An applied optimization framework for distributed air transportation environments. In: International conference on database and expert systems applications, pp 572–581Google Scholar
  9. Caunhye AM, Nie X, Pokharel S (2012) Optimization models in emergency logistics: a literature review. Socio Econ Plan Sci 46:4–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Cavallo EA, Powell A, Becerra O (2010) Estimating the direct economic damages of the earthquake in Haiti. Econ J 120:F298–F312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Chakravarty AK (2011) A contingent plan for disaster response. Int J Prod Econ 134:3–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Chan Y (2015) Network throughput and reliability: preventing hazards and attacks through gaming—part I: modeling. In: Game theoretic analysis of congestion, safety and security, pp 113–139Google Scholar
  13. Chen LM, Liu YE, Yang SJS (2015) Robust supply chain strategies for recovering from unanticipated disasters. Transp Res Part E Logist Transp Rev 77:198–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Cheung M, Zhuang J (2012) Regulation games between government and competing companies: oil spills and other disasters. Decis Anal 9:156–164CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Coles J, Zhuang J (2011) Decisions in disaster recovery operations: a game theoretic perspective on organization cooperation. J Homel Secur Emerg Manag 8:14Google Scholar
  16. Du L, Qian L (2016) The governments mobilization strategy following a disaster in the chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis. Nat Hazards 80:1411–1424CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Eid MS, El-adaway IH, Coatney KT (2015) Evolutionary stable strategy for postdisaster insurance: game theory approach. J Manag Eng 31:04015005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Ergun Ö, Gui L, Heier Stamm JL, Keskinocak P, Swann J (2014) Improving humanitarian operations through technology-enabled collaboration. Prod Oper Manag 23:1002–1014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Galindo G, Batta R (2013) Review of recent developments in OR/MS research in disaster operations management. Eur J Oper Res 230:201–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Guha-Sapir D, Below R, Hoyois P (2016) EM-DAT: international disaster database. Universit Catholique de Louvain Brussels Belgium. Accessed Oct (2016)Google Scholar
  21. Guha-Sapir D, Hoyois P, RB (2014) Annual disaster statistical review: the numbers and trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, BrusselsGoogle Scholar
  22. Gupta U, Ranganathan N (2007) Multievent crisis management using noncooperative multistep games. IEEE Trans Comput 56:577–589CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Hamilton R, McCain R (2009) Smallpox, risks of terrorist attacks, and the nash equilibrium: an introduction to game theory and an examination of the smallpox vaccination program. Prehosp Disaster Med 24:231–238CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Haphuriwat N, Bier VM (2011) Trade-offs between target hardening and overarching protection. Eur J Oper Res 213:320–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Hausken K, Zhuang J (2013) The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government. Eur J Oper Res 225:363–376CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Hausken K, Bier VM, Zhuang J (2009) Defending against terrorism, natural disaster, and all hazards. In: Bier VM, Azaiez MN (eds) Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats. International series in operations research and management science, vol 128. Springer, Boston, MAGoogle Scholar
  27. Helbing D (2013) Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature 497:51–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Horiuchi S (2012) Emergence and persistence of communities: analyses by means of a revised Hawk-Dove game. Sociol Theory Methods 27:299–306Google Scholar
  29. Keraminiyage K (2011) Can the game theory concept be applied affectively in post disaster reconstruction decision making? In: International conference on building resilience, Heritance Kandalama, Sri LankaGoogle Scholar
  30. Kesete Y, Peng J, Gao Y et al (2014) Modeling insurer–homeowner interactions in managing natural disaster risk. Risk Anal 34:1040–1055CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Khan ZA, Auguin M (2013) A multichannel design for QoS aware energy efficient clustering and routing in WMSN. Int J Sens Netw 13:145–161CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Knabb RD, Rhome JR, Brown DP (2005) Tropical cyclone report: Hurricane Katrina, 23–30 Aug 2005. National Hurricane CenterGoogle Scholar
  33. Kroshl WM, Sarkani S, Mazzuchi TA (2015) Efficient allocation of resources for defense of spatially distributed networks using agent-based simulation. Risk Anal 35:1690–1705CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Kunreuther H, Michel-Kerjan E (2015) Demand for fixed-price multi-year contracts: experimental evidence from insurance decisions. J Risk Uncertain 51:171–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Lai C, Chen X, Chen X, Wang Z, Wu X, Zhao S (2015) A fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model for flood risk based on the combination weight of game theory. Nat Hazards 77:1243–1259CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Lei Z (2008) Primary research on disaster risk management. In: 4th International conference on wireless communications, networking and mobile computing, 2008. WiCOM’08, pp 1–6Google Scholar
  37. Lettieri E, Masella C, Radaelli G (2009) Disaster management: findings from a systematic review. Disaster Prev Manag Int J 18:117–136CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Levy JK, Hipel KW, Howard N (2009) Advances in drama theory for managing global hazards and disasters. Part I: theoretical foundation. Group Decis Negot 18:303–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Levy JK, Hipel KW, Howard N (2009) Advances in drama theory for managing global hazards and disasters. Part II: coping with global climate change and environmental catastrophe. Group Decis Negot 18:317–334CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Li H, Zhu Q, Yang X, Xu L (2012) Geo-information processing service composition for concurrent tasks: a QoS-aware game theory approach. Comput Geosci 47:46–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Liu M, Fu X, Zhu B, Huang Y (2012) Analysis of the game between human beings and climatic environment based on two-stage dynamic chicken game model. In: Advances in electronic commerce, web application and communication, pp 97–100Google Scholar
  42. Lo SM, Huang HC, Wang P, Yuen K (2006) A game theory based exit selection model for evacuation. Fire Saf J 41:364–369CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Ma J, Song W, Lo SM, Fang Z (2013) New insights into turbulent pedestrian movement pattern in crowd-quakes. J Stat Mech Theory Exp 2013:P0202. doi: 10.1088/1742-5468/2013/02/P02028
  44. McLoughlin D (1985) A framework for integrated emergency management. Public Adm Rev 45:165–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Mulyono NB (2015) Mutual support in energy sector: toward energy resilience. Procedia Comput Sci 60:1041–1050CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. National Research Council (2011) Building community disaster resilience through private-public collaboration. The National Academies Press, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  47. Peng J, Shan XG, Gao Y et al (2014) Modeling the integrated roles of insurance and retrofit in managing natural disaster risk: a multi-stakeholder perspective. Nat Hazards 74:1043–1068CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Peng Y, Shen L, Zhang X, Ochoa JJ (2014) The feasibility of concentrated rural settlement in a context of post-disaster reconstruction: a study of China. Disasters 38:108–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Purohit S, Mantri S (2013) Game theoretic multi-agent approach to traffic flow control. In: 2013 International conference on advances in computing, communications and informatics (ICACCI), pp 1902–1905Google Scholar
  50. Quarantelli E (1998) What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question. RoutledgeGoogle Scholar
  51. Rahman A, Lownes NE, Ivan JN, Fiondella L, Rajasekaran S, Ammar R (2012) A game theory approach to identify alternative regulatory frameworks for hazardous materials routing. In: 2012 IEEE conference on technologies for homeland security (HST), pp 489–494Google Scholar
  52. Ranganathan N, Gupta U, Shetty R, Murugavel A (2007) An automated decision support system based on game theoretic optimization for emergency management in urban environments. J Homel Secur Emerg Manag 4(2):LRC1–LRC27Google Scholar
  53. Rubas DJ, Hill HS, Mjelde JW (2006) Economics and climate applications: exploring the frontier. Clim Res 33:43–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Scaparra MP, Church R (2012) Protecting supply systems to mitigate potential disaster a model to fortify capacitated facilities. Int Reg Sci Rev 35:188–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Smyrnakis M, Leslie DS (2010) Dynamic opponent modelling in fictitious play. Comput J 53:1344–1359CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Somov A, Rasheed T, Yedugundla VK (2013) Power control game for spectrum sharing in public safety communications. In: 2013 IEEE 18th international workshop on computer aided modeling and design of communication links and networks (CAMAD), pp 207–211Google Scholar
  57. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2017) About disaster management. http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disaster-management/. Accessed Sep 2017
  58. Vahidnia MH, Alesheikh AA, Alavipanah SK (2015) A multi-agent architecture for geosimulation of moving agents. J Geogr Syst 17:353–390CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Vasconcelos VV, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2015) Cooperation dynamics of polycentric climate governance. Math Models Methods Appl Sci 25:2503–2517CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Vásquez ÓC, Sepulveda JM, Alfaro MD, Osorio-Valenzuela L (2013) Disaster response project scheduling problem: a resolution method based on a game-theoretical model. Int J Comput Commun Control 8:334–345CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Wang Z, Xu W, Yang J, Peng J (2009) A game theoretic approach for resource allocation based on ant colony optimization in emergency management. In: International conference on information engineering and computer science, 2009. ICIECS 2009, pp 1–4Google Scholar
  62. Watanabe N, Kusukawa E (2015) Optimal ordering policy in dual-sourcing supply chain considering supply disruptions and demand information. Ind Eng Manag Syst 14:129–158Google Scholar
  63. Xu J, Zhuang J, Liu Z (2016) Modeling and mitigating the effects of supply chain disruption in a defender–attacker game. Ann Oper Res 236:255–270CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Yan W, Fengyong Z (2008) Analysis of the mechanisms of emergency management based on game theory. In: Wang YW, Xia KW, Shen QP (eds) Proceedings of 2008 international conference on construction and real estate management, vol 1–2, pp 1565–1568Google Scholar
  65. Yang J-J, Xu C-H (2012) Emergency decision engineering model based on sequential. Syst Eng Procedia 5:276–282CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Yang J, Wu Q, Cheng Y, Xu WS, Han CF (2008) Cooperative game scheduling of relief resources for unconventional emergency. Syst Eng 26:21–25Google Scholar
  67. Zhao L, Yi J, Adachi F, Zhang C, Zhang H (2012) Radio resource allocation for low-medium-altitude aerial platform based TD-LTE networks against disaster. In: 2012 IEEE 75th vehicular technology conference (VTC Spring), pp 1–5Google Scholar
  68. Zheng X, Cheng Y (2011) Modeling cooperative and competitive behaviors in emergency evacuation: a game-theoretical approach. Comput Math Appl 62:4627–4634CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Zhuang J, Bier VM (2007) Balancing terrorism and natural disasters-defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort. Oper Res 55:976–991CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Zhuang J, Coles J, Guan P, He F, Shan X (2012) Strategic interactions in disaster preparedness and relief in the face of man-made and natural disasters. In: 9th International conference on information systems for crisis response and management, Vancouver, CanadaGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringUniversity at BuffaloBuffaloUSA

Personalised recommendations