Despite an enormous quantity of data, contemporary neuroscience does not provide satisfactory explanations for the nature of mind or consciousness. Today the main searches for answers to these questions focus around the problem of the neural bases of consciousness. This article analyzes the most important characteristics of consciousness and the requirements to be met by any fundamental scientific theory explaining it. These criteria are used to critique the most widely discussed neuroscience theories of consciousness. Among them are some satisfying some of the key requirements, though none meets all. I propose that a neuroscientific understanding of consciousness requires us to start thinking of the brain not as a connectome, i.e., a neural network, but as a neural hypernetwork consisting of neuronal groups with specific cognitive properties. The structure of the cognitome is the same as the structure of mind, while consciousness is a specific process of large-scale integration of cognitive elements in this neural hypernetwork.
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Translated from Zhurnal Vysshei Nervnoi Deyatel’nosti imeni I. P. Pavlova, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 39–71, January–February, 2021.
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Anokhin, K.V. The Cognitome: Seeking the Fundamental Neuroscience of a Theory of Consciousness. Neurosci Behav Physi 51, 915–937 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11055-021-01149-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11055-021-01149-4