Abstract
The acceptability of any-DPs in existential modal sentences presents a challenge for theories of NPI licensing: existential modal sentences appear to differ substantially from other environments in which any-DPs are acceptable (in particular, they lack a downward-entailing operator). One approach to this challenge has been to, first, take any-DPs to be subject to an environment-based downward-entailingness condition—they have to occur in an environment that is Strawson downward-entailing with respect to their domain (cf. Kadmon and Landman 1993)—and, second, to derive such an environment in existential modal sentences by means of exhaustification (e.g., Fox 2007). This note presents new evidence for such a two-layered approach (cf. Crnič 2017, 2019). The evidence comes from a striking contrast in the behavior of singular vs. plural any-DPs in existential modal sentences. The paper concludes by charting some relations between any-DPs and other polarity items.
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Notes
These data were brought to my attention by Naomi Francis and Elise Newman in a seminar (Crnič 2018).
The definition of cross-categorial Strawson entailment is in (i) (cf. Gajewski 2011, Sect. 3). The notion of a constituent being Strawson downward-entailing with respect to the domain of an any-DP is defined in (ii).
- (i)
- (ii)
The maximal sets of alternatives that can be jointly negated with the sentence being true have the form in (i). They differ from each other in which book is subtracted from the subdomains. See Appendix A for more details.
- (i)
The presupposition that there are books in the domain of any (indicated by the conditional if there are such books in the main text) is crucial for the sentence to be Strawson downward-entailing with respect to it: if there are no books in a stronger domain D* that replaces the domain of any in evaluating Strawson downward-entailingness, existential quantification over it will yield a false meaning, and thus the Any Condition will be violated. This is different from what we observe in typical downward-entailing environments, where an empty domain leads to a tautologous meaning, which is trivially entailed by any sentence. Some support for the occurrences of any-DPs in existential modal sentences indeed being construed as presuppositional indefinites comes from, for example, their inability to occur in the pivot position of a there is construction (cf. Milsark 1974) (i), and from the standard presupposition projection tests (ii) (sequence (ii) is infelicitous because the conditional sentence inherits the presupposition that there are mistakes in this manuscript, which is triggered on the free choice construal of the any-DP in the antecedent of the conditional sentence; cf. von Fintel 1998).
-
(i)
-
a.
#There may be any boy in the garden.
-
b.
There may be a boy in any garden.
-
a.
-
(ii)
#I am not sure whether there are any mistakes in this manuscript, but if I am allowed to fix any mistake, it doesn’t matter.
See Crnič (2019, Sect. 2 of Part 1) for a further discussion of, and support for, any-DPs in existential modal sentences obligatorily triggering existence presuppositions. We do not represent the presuppositional construals for reasons of simplicity (see Diesing 1992; Büring 1998 for two possible approaches).
-
(i)
In line with the level of abstraction adopted in this note, we remain agnostic about whether some alternative-sensitive operator must associate with every occurrence of an any-DP. We merely assume that, as with other expressions in language (plain indefinites, disjunction, etc.), any-DPs have formal alternatives that can feature in exhaustification. A derivation of the Any Condition in (3) may well require an assumption of an alternative-sensitive operator that associates with any-DPs more generally, an assumption shared by many recent theories of any-DPs and other polarity items (esp., Krifka 1995; Lahiri 1998; Chierchia 2013; Crnič 2017, 2019).
We obtain the meaning in (18) if we assume that the universal modal has an existential modal alternative. In this case, no universal modal alternative built on any is excludable (see Bar-Lev and Fox 2020, though they make a different assumption about modals). If we do not admit existential modal sentences to our alternatives, the conclusion about Strawson downward-entailingness remains the same, though the free choice inferences are derived from the negations of the subdomain alternatives, which are of the form Gal is required to read a book in D’, and a single exhaustification suffices to derive these (Bar-Lev and Fox 2020, Sect. 5.5). Although the choice between the two derivations is unimportant at this juncture, it may be important elsewhere; see Sect. 5.3.
This is an oversimplification. Exhaustification is in principle predicted to be able to rescue occurrences of any-DPs in various non-modal environments in which they are c-commanded by an existential quantifier. The prediction is not borne out in general, which is often attributed to an intervention effect induced by the non-modal existential quantifier (esp., Chierchia 2013; see also Bar-Lev and Fox 2020). However, if any-DPs were admitted in the scope of some non-modal existential quantifiers, that is, if exhaustification could rescue them in those environments, one would expect them to exhibit a distribution that parallels that of any-DPs in existential modal sentences. One candidate for such an environment was brought up by a reviewer and is exemplified in (i): comparatives. Any-DPs exhibit sensitivity to number therein in a way that parallels existential modal sentences.
-
(i)
-
a.
Gal is taller than any boy in her class.
-
b.
#Gal is taller than any boys in her class.
-
a.
A possible structure of (i) that would account for this state of affairs is provided in (ii) (cf. Seuren 1973; Schwarzschild 2008). Whether such an analysis is plausible, or whether some alternative analysis is to be preferred, as well as what the precise distribution of this contrast is, requires an extensive engagement with the syntax/semantics of comparatives (cf. Aloni and Roelofsen 2014). We hope to pursue this engagement in the future.
- (i)
-
(i)
Any-DPs are acceptable in generic and imperative sentences. While the intuitive entailment patterns that those sentences give rise to appear to respect the Any Condition (for example, any dog barks intuitively entails any large dog barks), the derivation of these is controversial. According to the approach discussed in the main text, the acceptability of any-DPs would be expected in these environments if they had an underlying existential semantics, which may subsequently be strengthened to a universal one (cf. Bassi and Bar-Lev 2016 for one way of deriving such strengthening). This is in line with Nickel (2010) and Menéndez-Benito (2010, 2012) on generics and Kaufmann (2011) on imperatives. See Crnič (2018, 2019) for some more details.
Following Link (1983), we assume that the domain of individuals consists both of atoms and sums of individuals (proper pluralities), is partially ordered by a part-of relation (⊑), and is closed under sum formation (+). A definition of an atom is provided in (i-a) (which could be further relativized to include sortal information) and that of the ∗-operator is provided in (i-b) (which closes a set under sum formation).
- (i)
A reviewer observes that bare plurals appear to license stronger inferences than singular indefinites in existential modal sentence like (i), specifically, they appear to license free choice inferences involving all pluralities. We suggest that this follows from a generic construal of bare plurals (that is, generic quantification over all pluralities of books). Why generic quantification is unavailable for any-DPs is a vexing issue (see Dayal 2004a, 2004b; Chierchia 2013 on the absence of quantificational variability effects with any-DPs).
-
(i)
Gal can read books. (⇒ Every plurality of books is such that Gal can read them.)
-
(i)
A minimal element in a set is one that has no other element in the set as a part.
The failure of exhaustification due to an intervention effect can arise in Chierchia’s system because of a specific definition of exh that he employs. The definition employed in the main text, taken from Bar-Lev and Fox (2020), does not admit contradictions, and thus additional conditions would need to be introduced to account not only for the intervention effects but even for the basic unacceptability of NPIs in episodic upward-entailing environments. See Crnič (2021) for some further discussion of these issues.
If the denotations of mass nouns were divisive (e.g., Bunt 1979; Link 1983), exhaustification over the alternatives induced by mass any-DPs in existential modal sentences would yield contradictory meanings. Specifically, Crnič and Haida (2020) show that on the assumption of divisiveness, one would not be able to identify a maximal set of alternatives to an existential modal sentence with a mass any-DP that could be jointly negated with the sentence being true. Accordingly, all alternatives would be excludable, and their exclusion would yield a contradiction (unless it were appropriately restricted, but see Fox and Hackl 2006 on the limits of contextual restriction; see also Gajewski 2009). Thus, no matter what assumptions one makes about the structure of mass noun denotations, mass any-DPs are predicted to be unacceptable in existential modal sentences. Similar considerations may extend to ever in the main text since the domain of events/times may be divisive as well (cf. Humberstone 1979). See Crnič and Haida (2020) for details.
The acceptability of mass any-DPs in existential modal sentences improves if we coerce a container/subkind construal of the mass expressions. The coercion in such readings arguably makes the domain of any non-cumulative (corresponding to the singular case), allowing for the satisfaction of the Any Condition.
An alternative account of the data is conceivable, one on which the condition on the distribution of ever is substantively different from the (Any) Condition: it pertains not to the \(\underline{\mathrm{domain}\ \mathrm{of}\ \mathit{ever}}\) but to \(\underline{\mathit{ever}\ \mathrm{itself}.}\) Consequently, the exhaustification could not rescue ever in modal environments (recall that exhaustification yields a Strawson downward-entailing environment with respect to the domain of an existential quantifier, not the existential quantifier itself). A fully fledged out theory of this may well give rise to, however, the expectation that the distribution of ever should parallel that of minimizer NPIs, contrary to fact (cf. Heim 1984; Crnič 2014a).
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010) point to intricate differences between algunos and irgend indefinites (for example, involving non-uniqueness inferences). The additional restrictions discussed in the literature that these expressions may be subject to can be adopted wholesale without affecting our classification.
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010) present data that suggest that the behavior of plural irgend and algunos indefinites come apart with respect to the obligatoriness of exhaustification: with the latter, it seems to be optional, as witnessed by the optionality of the ignorance inferences.
Not all expressions discussed under (E) above are acceptable in non-modalized upward-entailing environments. For example, wh indefinites in Slovenian are not, as shown in (i). Chierchia (2013) ascribes this potential variation to a parameter pertaining to where exh accompanying the pertinent expressions may attach. This is not easily captured on the assumptions adopted in this section, in which there is a single exhaustification mechanism accompanying all ‘modal indefinites’. Accordingly, this uniformity assumption may need to be given up.
- (i)
Dayal (2004a) makes another pertinent observation, which is not at odds with the Any Condition, however: numeral any-DPs are marked in downward-entailing environments (i-a). This seems to be part of a more general pattern: negative quantifiers are also marked when they contain a numeral (i-b). An explanation of these facts is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Chierchia 2013, Ch. 5, for a direction involving intervention.
-
(i)
-
a.
#Gal didn’t read any two books.
-
b.
#No two students read a book.
-
a.
-
(i)
Chierchia (2013, Ch. 6) provides a detailed treatment of this phenomenon. In his system, any-DPs are admitted in existential and ruled out in universal modal sentences due to the interplay of two assumptions: obligatory wide-scope of any-DPs in modal contexts (Wide-Scope Constraint) and the alternatives in the domain of exh obligatorily differing in a specific way in the conversational backgrounds of the modals occurring in them (Modal Containment). Numeral any-DPs are, then, admitted in universal modal sentences due to the Wide-Scope Constraint being a violable default: it is ranked below a constraint that prohibits sentences with polarity items to have equivalent alternatives in which the items are replaced with designated alternatives (Scale Economy). In the case at hand, these would be the alternatives based on any-DPs with other numerals: all of them yield contradictory meanings if scoping above the modal, which allows them to exceptionally scope below the modal. See also Dayal (2013) for an alternative approach.
If the plural marking requirement for higher-order readings of questions could be obviated, singular any-DPs would, all else being equal, be admitted in universal modal sentences (if the requisite questions could be accommodated).
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Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Moshe Bar-Lev, Danny Fox, and Tue Trinh for comments on an earlier draft of the paper, as well as to Irene Heim, Angelika Kratzer and two exceptional reviewers for Natural Language Semantics. Thanks also to the participants of the MIT seminar in semantics in Fall 2018.
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This research was supported in part by the Volkswagen Foundation (VWZN3181) and the Israel Science Foundation (2861/21).
Appendices
Appendix A: Singular any-DPs in existential modal sentences, in detail
This section elaborates on the presentation in Sect. 2.1 (see Crnič 2017, 2019 for further details).
In the following, we take the resource domain D of any to consist of three books, {a, b, c}, and we represent alternatives with their translations into propositional logic formulas. Moreover, existential quantification is represented with disjunction, while universal quantification (and distributive predication over plurals) is represented with conjunction in the standard manner.
The sentence in (111-a) has the LF in (111-b).
- (111)
Formal alternatives
The alternatives to the sister of exh in (111-b) are provided in (112) (following Krifka 1995 and, esp., Chierchia 2013): they are derived by replacing the domain of any with its subdomains, and any with every. In the following, we rely on the characterization in the bottom row of (112), where ‘◊(a∨b)’ stands for the meaning corresponding to Gal being allowed to read a book in {a, b}, etc. (The sentence has other alternatives, say, those in which Gal is replaced with John, but these are irrelevant for the purpose at hand.)
- (112)
Excludable alternatives
Recall the definition of excludable alternatives:
- (113)
What are the excludable alternatives in (112)? One maximal set of alternatives in (113) that can be jointly negated with the sister of exh being true is provided in (114). This is witnessed by (115) being consistent, and by the fact that if the set of the alternatives that get negated is expanded by any of the subtracted alternatives, we obtain a contradiction.
- (114)
- (115)
All other maximal sets of alternatives in (112) that can be jointly negated with the sister of exh being true have a similar form and are provided in (116)–(117).
- (116)
- (117)
The intersection of these maximal sets—that is, the set of excludable alternatives in (112)—is provided in (118): it consists of all the alternatives that have a (non-trivial) conjunctive meaning (if a proposition is conjoined with itself, we obtain a trivial conjunction).
- (118)
More generally, the sets of the alternatives that can be jointly negated with the sister of exh being true have the form in (119), while their instersection has the form in (120).
- (119)
- (120)
Includable alternatives
Recall Bar-Lev and Fox’s (2020) definition of includable alternatives:
- (121)
What are the includable alternatives in (112)? They are all the disjunction alternatives (incl. the trivial disjunction alternatives), as given in (122). This is witnessed by the consistency of (123), which is a conjunction of all the alternatives in (122) with the negations of all the excludable alternatives; moreover, asserting a non-trivial conjunction alternative (which is the only type of alternative that is not in (122)) would obviously contradict the negation of one of the excludable conjunctive alternatives, which shows that the set in (122) is indeed maximal.
- (122)
- (123)
Exhaustification and obligatory pruning
Recall the definition of exh:
- (124)
What is the meaning of the structure (111-b)? This depends on what alternatives are relevant, that is, on the resolution of R. If all the formal alternatives to the sister of exh are relevant, ALT([◊ [any\(_{\text{D}}\) book\(_{\text{x}}\) [Gal read x]]]) ⊆ 〚R〛, the meaning we obtain is the one provided in (125) (the same result is obtained for any R that denotes a superset of the set consisting of all the excludable alternatives, Excl([◊ [any\(_{\text{D}}\) book\(_{\text{x}}\) [Gal read x]]]) ⊆ 〚R〛). On the other hand, if none of the alternatives are relevant, the meaning that we obtain is the one provided in (126). There are further conceivable resolutions of R (but see Katzir 2014; Crnič et al. 2015; Bar-Lev 2018 on some constraints on the pruning of alternatives).
- (125)
- (126)
How do we choose between the potential resolutions of R? It turns out that the choice is not completely free—it is partly dictated by the Any Condition. In order to obtain a Strawson downward-entailing environment with respect to the domain of any, all the disjunctive (incl. the single disjunct alternatives) must count as irrelevant (unless they are equivalent to the sister of exh). In other words, from the set in (112), only the excludable alternatives in (118) may be in 〚R〛 (together with the alternatives that are equivalent to the sister of exh) (cf. Buccola and Haida 2019 on obligatorily irrelevant alternatives):
- (127)
Let us first show that we indeed get Strawson downward-entailingness with respect to the domain of any if (127) obtains. The interpretation of the structure in (111-b) is provided in (128) (the parentheses indicate that the exclusion of the alternatives depends on R).
- (128)
If we replace D with a proper (non-empty) subdomain of D (and keep R fixed), we obtain a Strawson weaker meaning. Two such replacements are provided in (129), where each of the meanings is entailed by the meaning in (128): there are fewer asserted includable alternatives, while the negated excludable alternatives are constant across all the substitutions of D.
- (129)
What happens, however, if (127) does not obtain? In this case, at least one replacement of domain D will not result in a Strawson weaker meaning. For illustration, assume that ◊(a∨b) ∈ 〚R〛 (falsifying (127), since ◊(a∨b) is not an excludable alternative). Now, the meaning of the sentence with domain D is provided in (130), where the content of ϕ depends on what alternatives are in 〚R〛 besides ◊(a∨b). The meaning of the corresponding structure in which D is replaced by a stronger domain \(D'\), namely 〚D′〛={c}, is provided in (131), where ψ depends on what alternatives are in 〚R〛 besides ◊(a∨b).
- (130)
- (131)
The meaning in (130) clearly does not entail the meaning in (131), no matter what the content of ϕ and ψ is—in fact, (130) entails the negation of (131). The same conclusion is reached for every other R that fails to satisfy the condition in (127). This is summarized in (132) , where the alternatives equivalent to the sister of exh are omitted for brevity.
- (132)
Summary
Exhaustification over the alternatives introduced by singular any-DPs in existential modal sentences, as in (111-b), creates a Strawson downward-entailing environment with respect to the domain of any—which results in the any-DP satisfying the Any Condition—if none of the includable alternatives are in the resource domain of exh, R (besides the sister of exh and any alternatives equivalent to it).
Appendix B: Plural any-DPs in existential modal sentences, in detail
This section elaborates on the presentation in Sect. 2.2.
We assume in the following that the domain D corresponds to the closure of the set of three books under sum formation, ∗{a,b,c}, that is, {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}. We adopt the notation of the preceding section, with existential quantification (distributive predication) over {a+b} being represented as a∧b, etc.
The sentence in (133-a) may have the LF in (133-b).
- (133)
Formal alternatives
The alternatives to the sister of exh in (133-b) are in (134): they are the alternatives derived by replacing the domain of any with its subdomains, and any with all. (An element is in the disjunctive closure of a set P iff it is in P or if it is a disjunction of two elements each of which is in the disjunctive closure of P.)
- (134)
Excludable alternatives
What are the excludable alternatives in (134)? One maximal set of alternatives in (134) that can be jointly negated with the sister of exh being true is provided in (135). This is witnessed by (136) being consistent, and by the fact that if the set of alternatives that get negated is expanded by any of the subtracted alternatives, we obtain a contradiction.
- (135)
- (136)
All other maximal sets of alternatives in (134) that can be jointly negated with the sister of exh being true have a similar form and are provided in (137)–(138).
- (137)
- (138)
The intersection of these maximal sets—that is, the set of excludable alternatives in (134)—is provided in (139): it consists of all the conjunctive alternatives and all the disjunctive alternatives in which all the disjuncts are (non-trivial) conjunctions.
- (139)
Excludable alternatives more generally
More generally, the maximal sets of alternatives that can be jointly negated with the sentence being true are those that have the form in (140): all the alternatives in (140) can be negated with the sentence being true (namely, it can hold that Gal is allowed to read book or books x).
- (140)
The set of excludable alternatives is, then, the set of alternatives based on universal quantifiers (and their equivalents based on any) whose meaning asymmetrically entails one of the alternatives (or their disjunctions) that have a singleton domain containing a plurality of books from D none of whose proper parts are also in the domain D of any.
- (141)
Includable alternatives
What are the includable alternatives in (134)? They are all the disjunction alternatives in which at least one disjunct is not a (non-trivial) conjunction, as given in (142). This is witnessed by the consistency of (143), which is a conjunction of all the alternatives in (142) with the negations of all the excludable alternatives (it is verified in any situation in which ◊a∧◊b∧◊c is true and all excludable alternatives are false); moreover, asserting a conjunction or a disjunction of conjunctions (which is the only type of formal alternative that is not in (142)) would obviously contradict a negation of one of the excludable conjunctive alternatives, which shows that the set in (142) is indeed maximal.
- (142)
- (143)
Includable alternatives more generally
On the assumption of the more general formulation of excludable alternatives in (141), the includable alternatives are those based on any (and their equivalents based on every) such that the domain of any in them contains at least one plurality none of whose proper parts are in the domain D.
- (144)
Exhaustification
What is the meaning of the structure in (133-b)? This depends on which alternatives are relevant, that is, on the resolution of R. If we assume that all the excludable alternatives are relevant, we obtain the meaning in (145).
- (145)
Given this resolution of R, the structure in (133-b) is not Strawson downward-entailing with respect to the domain of any. Consider the counterpart of (133-b) with a stronger domain D∗ that consists of all proper pluralities, that is, D∗ = {a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}. The sets of excludable and includable alternatives in ALT([◊ [\(\text{any}_{\text{D}^{*}}\) booksx [Gal read x]]]) are provided in (146)–(147).
- (146)
- (147)
Consequently, this structure has the meaning in (148).
- (148)
This meaning is obviously not entailed by the meaning in (145), which demonstrates that the structure (133-b) on the proposed resolution of R is not Strawson downward-entailing with respect to the domain D. Now, adding to R alternatives that are not excludable cannot improve the situation (see the discussion in Appendix A) nor can pruning of excludable alternatives: the includable alternatives that are asserted when the domain of any is D∗ are not entailed by the includable alternatives that are asserted when the domain of any is D.
Exhaustification more generally
Combining the more general formulations of the excludable and includable alternatives, (141) and (144), and the same assumptions about R as above, we obtain the meaning in (149). This corresponds to every plurality of books that does not have proper parts in D being such that Gal is allowed to read it, and every plurality of books that does have proper parts in D being such that Gal is not allowed to read it.
- (149)
- (150)
The meaning in (149)–(150) need not entail one of the sentence in which the domain D is replaced with a subdomain, in particular, if the subdomain has distinct minimal elements than D. This means that the Strawson downward-entailingness required by the Any Condition does not obtain in (133-b). The generalization about free choice inferences pertaining to the minimal elements, provided in (33) in the main text, can be read off from the representations in (149)–(150).
Strong meanings of plural NPs
The state of the affairs does not change substantively if the plural NPs do not have number-neutral interpretations. For example, assume that D = {a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c} and that D∗ = {a+b+c}. The meanings of the pertinent structures with domains D and D∗ are provided in (151) and (152), respectively (again, the exclusion depends on the choice of R, thus the parentheses). Given that (151) fails to entail (152), the requisite Strawson downward-entailingness does not obtain here either.
- (151)
- (152)
Summary
Exhaustification over the alternatives introduced by plural any-DPs in existential modal sentences does not create a Strawson downward-entailing environment with respect to the domain of any—resulting in the any-DP not being able to satisfy the Any Condition.
Appendix C: The even approach to any-DPs
We describe how the results obtained in the main text can be derived in the approach of Crnič (2017, 2019) (who builds on Kadmon and Landman 1993; Lahiri 1998). The approach has as a consequence a condition on the distribution of any-DPs that differs from the Any Condition when it comes to non-monotone environments (as detailed in Crnič 2019).
The setup
On this approach, any-DPs are accompanied by a covert even operator that quantifies over the alternatives built on the alternatives to the domain of any (see Lahiri 1998 for a derivation in which even associates with the determiner). We follow Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2013) in assuming that the relevant alternatives to a (focused) domain are its subdomains.
- (153)
Even primarily triggers the ordering presupposition in (154), where the relevant ordering relation (<) is filled in by the context (it could be logical entailment, Strawson entailment, contextual entailment, lower-likelihood, or some other relation that respects additivity).
- (154)
The precise predictions of the theory depend on the resolution of < in the context. If this is resolved to (contextual) Strawson entailment relation, we obtain straightforwardly that any-DPs are acceptable in Strawson downward-entailing environments that are not also Strawson upward-entailing, that singular any-DPs are acceptable in existential modal sentences, and that plural any-DPs are unacceptable in existential modal sentences (see Crnič 2019 for a detailed discussion of the first two cases).
Singular any-DPs
The sentence in (155-a) has the LF in (155-b).
- (155)
The presupposition of (155-b)) is provided in (156). Since the exhaustified constituent is Strawson downward-entailing with respect to the domain of any, as seen in Sect. 2.1 and Appendix A, the presupposition is trivially satisfied, and thus the any-DP is predicted to be acceptable.
- (156)
Plural any-DPs
In the case of plural any-DPs, the scalar presupposition triggered by even is inconsistent (at least on the assumption that < picks out the contextual Strawson entailment relation). The sentence in (157-a)) has the LF in (157-b).
- (157)
Let us focus on the following subdomain of D: D∗ = {a+b+c} (recall our assumption from the preceding appendix section that D = ∗{a, b, c}). The presupposition of even in (157) depends on how we resolve the resource domain of exh, R. There are several options available to us, but it suffices to consider just two. First: if 〚R〛 contains no excludable alternatives, the meanings of the exhaustified sentences with domains D and D∗ are the following:
- (158)
- (159)
Since the meaning in (159) is not equivalent to that in (158), even presupposes that it is (contextually) Strawson entailed by (158). This is not the case since the logical entailment goes the other way around. On this resolution of R, the any-DP is correctly predicted to be unacceptable. Second: if R contains an excludable alternatives, say, just ◊(a∧b), the meanings of the exhaustified sentences with domains D and D∗ are the following:
- (160)
- (161)
Since the meaning in (161) is not equivalent to that in (160), even presupposes that it is (contextually) Strawson entailed by (160). This is not the case since (160) actually entails the negation of (161). On this resolution of R, the any-DP is also correctly predicted to be unacceptable.
Other ordering relations
If the ordering used by even is resolved to a weaker relation than (contextual) Strawson entailment, say, lower-likelihood in the context (cf., e.g., Karttunen and Peters 1979; Lahiri 1998; Crnič 2014b), nothing changes in the analysis of the singular any-DP case (see Crnič 2019 for details). In the case of plural any-DPs, on the other hand, we obtain contradictory presuppositions on some resolutions of R, and contingent (potentially implausible) presuppositions on other resolutions. We discuss two cases here. First: if no alternatives to the sister of exh are in R, we obtain a contradictory presupposition, namely, the meaning of the structure in which D∗ replaces D is stronger than the meaning of the structure with D, and thus at most as likely. On this resolution of R, the any-DP is correctly predicted to be unacceptable.
- (162)
Second: if the excludable alternatives to the sister of exh are relevant, we obtain a contingent presupposition. Namely, while the meaning of the structure in which D∗ replaces D contradicts the meaning of the structure with D, it may nonetheless be more likely than it.
- (163)
Consequently, on this resolution of < and R, the prediction of the approach described above is not that we have an unacceptable occurrence of an any-DP, but rather one whose felicity depends on the plausibility of the scalar presupposition in the context (if this is implausible, the sentence is marked). However, another property of even affects the acceptability of the sentence on this resolution: even tends to be infelicitous when the alternatives it quantifies over are incompatible with its sister (see Guerzoni 2003; Francis 2018 for a discussion). Since this is necessarily the case if 〚R〛 contains excludable alternatives, the unacceptability of the plural any-DPs may be attributed to this property of even (see Crnič 2019 for some related discussion).
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Crnič, L. Number in NPI licensing. Nat Lang Semantics 30, 1–46 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-022-09186-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-022-09186-6