‘According to’ phrases and epistemic modals

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Abstract

I provide an objection to an argument targeting the claim that epistemic modality concerns what is possible or necessary given what is known. The argument centers around uses of epistemic modals that co-occur with adjuncts of the form ‘according to X’, those in which the content of some reported information is at issue. I argue that such contexts do not license us to reach the sort of conclusion that the argument aims to reach.

Keywords

Epistemic modality Evidentiality Necessity Knowledge Evidence 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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