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On truthful auction mechanisms for electricity allocation with multiple time slots

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Abstract

As technology evolves and electricity demand rises, an increasing number of researches have focused on the efficient electricity allocation mechanisms so as to make consumer demand adaptive to the supply of electricity at all times. Considering the respective characteristics of the fixed price and the dynamic price model commonly used in the electricity market, in this paper, we formulate the problem of electricity allocation as a novel combinatorial auction model, and then put forward two directly applicable mechanisms called TAMEA-FP based on fixed price model and TAMEA-DP based on dynamic price model respectively. In addition, it is theoretically proven that both the proposed mechanisms are equipped with the economic properties such as individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. Finally, extensive simulation results show that both the proposed mechanisms own the allocation efficiency and computational traceability with the time complexity.

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Notes

  1. Generally, the unit of electricity is ‘KW’. In this paper, the unit of resource of electricity is called ’unit’ for more generalized model.

  2. Given r 1 =< r 11,…,r 1m > and r 2 =< r 21,…,r 2m > ,we donate r 1 ⊆ r 2if r 11 ≤ r 21&…r 1m & ≤ r 2m .

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Acknowledgements

Project supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant No.61170201, No.61070133, No.61472344), Six talent peaks project in Jiangsu Province (Grant No.2011–DZXX–032), Jiangsu Science and Technology Project (Grant No. BY2015061-06,BY2015061-08), Yangzhou Science and Technology Project (Grant No. SXT20140048, SXT20150014, SXT201510013), Natural Science Foundation of the Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (Grant No.14KJB520041).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou, China

    Junwu Zhu, Heng Song, Yi Jiang & Bin Li

  2. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Guelph University, Guelph, ON, Canada

    Junwu Zhu

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  1. Junwu Zhu
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  2. Heng Song
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  3. Yi Jiang
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  4. Bin Li
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Correspondence to Junwu Zhu.

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Zhu, J., Song, H., Jiang, Y. et al. On truthful auction mechanisms for electricity allocation with multiple time slots. Multimed Tools Appl 77, 10753–10772 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-017-4855-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-017-4855-y

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