Charging Control of Electric Vehicles in Smart Grid: a Stackelberg Differential Game Based Approach
- 62 Downloads
In this paper, we investigate the charging control problems of the electrical vehicles in smart grid, where electricity transactions exist between the aggregation and the electrical vehicles. We use the Stackelberg differential game to formulate the charging/discharging interactions between the aggregation and the electrical vehicles, where the dynamic behavior of the energy levels of the aggregation and the electrical vehicles are formulated as a differential game, and the charging/discharging interactions between the aggregation and the electrical vehicles are formulated as a Stackelberg game. The aggregation acts as the leader, and control the electricity price for to maximize the payoff. The electrical vehicles acts as the followers, and control their charging/discharging power to minimize the energy cost. Two kinds of equilibrium solutions to the Stackelberg differential game will be analyzed, which are the open loop equilibriums and the feedback equilibriums, respectively. The obtained equilibrium solutions can be considered as the optimal control for the aggregations and the electrical vehicles. Numerical simulations and results show the effectiveness and advantages of the proposed algorithms.
KeywordsCharging control Stackelberg differential game Electrical vehicles Smart grid
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation Project of China (No.61501026), and the research is partially supported by US MURI, NSF CNS-1717454, CNS-1731424, CNS-1702850, CNS-1646607, and ECCS-1547201.
- 3.Ma Z, Callaway D, Hiskens I (2010) Decentralized charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles: application of the Nash certainty equivalence principle. In: IEEE International conference on control applications. YokohamaGoogle Scholar
- 4.Fan Z (2011) Distributed charging of PHEVs in a smart grid. Interconnections and Communications of Electric Vehicles and Smart Grids (IEEE SmartGridComm), BrusselsGoogle Scholar
- 5.Yuan W, Huang J, Zhang YJ (2017) Competitive charge station pricing for plug-in electric vehicles. IEEE Trans Smart Grid 8(2):628–639Google Scholar
- 8.Mohammadi J, Vaya M, Kar S, Hug G (2016) A fully distributed approach for plug-in electric vehicle charging. In: Power systems computation conference. GenoaGoogle Scholar
- 9.Li Y, Kaewpuang R, Wang P, Niyato D, Han Z (2012) An energy efficient solution: integrating plug-In hybrid electric vehicle in smart grid with renewable energy. In: Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM workshops. OrlandoGoogle Scholar
- 10.Gharesifard B, Basar T, Dominguez-Garcia AD (2013) Price-based distributed control for networked plug-in electric vehicles. In: American control conference. Washington DCGoogle Scholar
- 12.Chen J, Yang B, Zhou H, Chen C, Guan X (2015) Charging station selection and charging price decision for PEV: a two level game approach. In: Proceedings of the 34th Chinese control conference. HangzhouGoogle Scholar
- 18.Basar T, Olsder GJ (1998) Dynamic noncooperative game theory. Society for Industrial and Applied MathematicsGoogle Scholar
- 19.Han Z, Niyato D, Saad W, Basar T, Hjorungnes A (2011) Game theory in wireless and communication networks: theory, models and applications. Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
- 20.Yeung DWK, Petrosjan LA (2006) Cooperative stochastic differential games. Springer Science & Business MediaGoogle Scholar