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Psychological outcomes of REDD + projects: evidence from country case studies

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Abstract

We apply self-determination theory (SDT) to explain how psychological outcomes on participants in ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD +) projects can provide lessons for other forest landscape management programmes. Evidence from REDD + case studies suggests that negative outcomes may result from three design factors. Payment for environmental services (PES) may reduce participants’ motivation and competence in livelihood activities. A large-scale landscape approach to REDD + increases stakeholder heterogeneity which may reduce participants’ ability to liaise and cooperate. Trade-offs between traditional forest uses and conservation goals may reduce participants’ autonomy to develop their livelihoods. By inference, replicating these design factors in comparable forest landscape management programmes or projects may also result in similar negative outcomes. Replacing PES with additional—not substitute—livelihood-based capacity building and reducing the physical landscape to the social landscape which encompasses stakeholders’ capacity to work together may mitigate these outcomes.

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Notes

  1. In Nepal, Dalits are one of the lower social castes.

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Correspondence to Jack Baynes.

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Appendix

Appendix

Extracts from 46 REDD + case studies which show positive (italics) or negative (normal font) social outcomes, grouped according to three themes, i.e. the SDT needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy. Extracts for the theme ‘competence’ were coded as reflecting improved opportunities (+ C) or restrictions (− C) to livelihood activities, perceived usefulness of technology supplied to participants (+ T or − T) and the adequacy or inadequacy of financial compensation (+ Fin or − Fin). For the theme of ‘relatedness’, the extracts were coded as reflecting equity or inequity in benefit distribution or participation (+ Eq or − Eq), inclusion or exclusion from project activities (+ Inc or − Inc) or changes to the trust (+ Tr or − Tr) between stakeholders. For the theme ‘autonomy’, extracts were coded as reflecting voluntary participation or coercion to participate (+ Vol or − Vol) and attempts by governments of other stakeholders to improve or reduce participants’ property rights (+ P or − P).

Case study

SDT needs

Competence

Relatedness

Autonomy

Groom and Palmer (2012, China)

The SLCP appeared to restrict autonomy in terms of how households allocated their labour. (p.48)

(+ C)

 

A lack of autonomy… over land use… may result in unwelcome and unwanted shifts in livelihoods. (p. 51, China)

In some places the program was involuntary… (p.49, China) (− Vol)

Jindal et al. (2012, Mozambique)

… the most important threat to permanence is the extremely long contract period. …based in a 100 year contract period… (which) subjects future generations to a rule they may not agree with. (p. 2133) (− Fin)

The existence of the community fund has enabled households to better articulate their development needs. (p.2132) (+ Eq)

Non-participating households may also face increased hardship from a ban on harvesting from the large tract of miombo forest under REDD activities. (p.2132) (− P)

Konsager and Corbera (2015, Belize)

…projects should have contributed more to surrounding villages by promoting alternative livelihood activities, such as handcrafts… (p. 139) (− Fin)

  

La Rose (2013, Guyana)

 

There is much intimidation in getting the leaders to sign the document. (p. 9) (− Eq)

…those who dare… are publicly vilified… (p.9), (− Tr)

 

Airey and Krause (2018 Guyana)

No one really understand about it… We ain’t getting the understanding… (p. 58) (− T)

 

…we decide what is ours, we decide what is good for us, you don’t come from the coastland telling us that this should be good for you (p. 62) (− Vol)

Duong and Groot (2018, Vietnam)

 

Households on one side of the commune boundary may receive a much lower payment … than those on the other side, even though they may be more active to protect their forest. (p.27)

The basic distributional principle… paying the most to households and communities which own the most forest… open to being felt as an injustice… (p.28) (− Eq)

 

Hoang et al. (2018, Vietnam)

  

This…is my garden. I have the legal right to ask everyone to leave it, not only you guys, but also the UN-REDD staff (p.529) (− P)

Williams and Dupuy (2019, Vietnam)

 

Just over a third of our case interviewees… noted that corruption risks relating to rightful landowners not receiving a fair proportion of benefits due to inadequate consultation were high. (p.2139) (− Eq)

 

Ramcilovic-Suominen (2019, Laos)

By addressing… small-scale drivers such as subsistence agriculture, REDD + directly limits villager’s main source of livelihoods… (p. 277) (− C)

 

REDD + acts as a tool for state territorialisation… by… regulate village forest uses and users. (p. 263) (− P)

(REDD +) advances the Laos political economy, political elite and power establishment. (p. 277) (− Vol

Vatn et al. (2017, Tanzania)

Similarly, quite positive… provision of knowledge, creation of awareness emphasis on village development… (p.6) (+ C)

Payments were equal per person… reflect local norms… (p.8) (+ Eq)

…23 out of 240 households had to leave their homes and resettle…there were instances of burned homes. (p.6) (− P)

… a large majority felt that they felt free to decide… (+ Vol)

Lund et al. (2017, Tanzania)

It took my people by surprise to learn how technical and complex REDD + is. (p.132) (− T)

Tenure conflicts… lack of local governance… were key challenges across projects (p.132) (− Eq)

 

Nantongo (2017, Tanzania)

 

Although there was an early socio-economic study to assess the livelihoods of local people… there was no consultation with the locals… (− Inc)

 

Andrews and Mulder 2018, Tanzania)

 

REDD-ready SCC in Pemba vary extensively in the trust that they are viewed by community members… (p.105) (− Tr)

 

Jacob and Brockington (2017, Tanzania)

The availability of carbon revenues has made a material difference to villagers’ lives… (p.6) (+ Fin)

They (…officials…) attend so many trainings but they don’t share. (p.5)

(− Inc)

…complaints that supporting a school only benefits families with children… If only there were many other villagers with that sort of internal debate. (p.6) (+ Inc)

 

Massarella et al. (2018, Tanzania)

You can pilot and you can forget. But our idea was to do something and then… repeat from there. (p.383) (− T)

… a feeling of injustice that the project only benefitted a few people… (p.381)

(− Inc)

Other actors blamed the ‘top-down’ approach of REDD + ‘convincing people to do whatever they want them to do’. (p.382) (− Vol)

Saito-Jensen et al. (2014, Nepal)

… some recipients viewed the benefits as burdens… the use of payments for higher-value items such as biogas plants may risk inadvertently indebting recipients… (p,689) (− Fin)

Targeting of specific social groups resulted in contestation at the local level… This approach resulted in shame and denial by some of those who were labelled as poor. (p.689) (− Eq)

 

Shrestha and Shrestha (2017, Nepal)

REDD + payments do not play a significant part in participation… due to the predefined criteria in the REDD + payment mechanism. (p.69) (− C)

  

Khatri et al. (2018, Nepal)

Providing a loan for a market-based activity can actually impose risks for households with very little resources. (p.4) (− Fin)

… in some cases, the distribution of pilot money to different social groups did not materialise. (p.4) (− Inc)

… it required that the CFUGs invest at least 40% of the payments… as a condition of further payments. (p.4)

(− Vol)

Satyal et al. (2018, Nepal)

 

Dalits were excluded from decision making… due to… lack of information and communication… (p.9) (− Inc)

… women and Dalits have all actively participated… (p.8) (+ Inc)

It has become a passive ‘smile’ type of participation. (p. 10) (− Vol)

Luintel et al. (2018, Nepal)

 

Mutual trust… is found to have no relation with carbon storage. (p.45)

(− Tr)

 

Twongyirwe et al. (2015, Uganda)

… the funding of REDD + is so huge that our corrupt officials cannot relay where it is meant to go (p.284) (− Fin)

 

… if REDD + imposes further controls on the use of forest resources and rewards others, the Batwa may revolt. (p.289 (− P)

Dawson et al. (2018, Nepal and Uganda)

It is clear that no-one has a common understanding of REDD + . (p.3) (− T)

…. The locals don’t agree, the trust isn’t developed … so when you go back after 2–10 or 15 years and see the forest has been burnt down. (p.3) (− Tr)

…participants stressed that inclusion criteria … to ensure marginalised groups participate… were meaningless because their quality of participation was negligible. (p.4) (− Eq)

I refer to it as ‘climate colonisation’. (p.3) (− Vol)

Fisher et al. (2018, Uganda)

…participants are not actively involved in project design… and the project confers restrictions… (p.267) (− C)

… and they are paying little money and we have sacrificed our land to…

… benefit sharing is a myth… (p.264) (− Fin)

  

Kansanga and Luginaah (2019, Uganda)

 

…to get even temporary access to farmland in the forest you have to pass through an influential person using money… (p.138) (− Tr)

As I speak, there is no other land to go to… Yet, the GFC taskforce keeps destroying our farms. (p. 137) (− P)

Fischer and Hajdu (2018, Uganda)

…favouring of technical …competence… over local knowledge… (p. 337) (− T)

 

… some actors have had the power to impose their will on others (p.329)

Communities may resist the project since the NFA used force… (p.332)

(− Vol)

Atela et al. (2014, Kenya)

… this equitable share has not met community expectations because of the opportunity costs imposed by restricted forest access. (p. 247) (− C)

The (forest service) staff asserted that REDD + funks linked to the hills would be channelled to central government. (p.246) (− Fin)

Even though non-group members may be excluded… (p.242) (− Inc)

Low-wealth respondents perceived that incorporating communal land into the project improved their bargaining power… (p.246) (+ Eq)

 

Chomba et al. (2016, Kenya)

… the big losers were the smallholder farmers who wore the opportunity cost … and received very modest benefits. (p.207) (− Fin)

 

… the project often led to landowners, despite often being absentee, imposing greater control over their land… (p.210) (− P)

… illegal squatters were peacefully removed. (p.210) (− Vol)

Pearse and Dehn (2011, Indonesia)

This tension between human rights and economic efficiency is inescapable… (p.21) (− C)

…not listening to local knowledge and wisdom… (p.13) (− T)

Project implementation is bringing unrest and internal conflict to the community… (p.17) (− Tr)

The continued lack of respect for… FPIC… and the rights of affected communities… (p.10) (− Vol)

Harada et al. (2015, Indonesia)

 

The local NGO built confident relationships with the national park authorities… trust with (local people) was built… (p. 15) (+ Tr)

 

Eilenberg (2015, Indonesia)

 

…communicated within elite networks at district level and only sporadic information reached the community level… (p.55)

REDD + was seen… as yet another attempt by central government to take control over customary forest (p.57)

(–Inc)

REDD + was seen… as yet another attempt by central government to take control over customary forest (p.57)

(− P)

REDD + initiatives were… appropriated locally based on past experiences of resource struggle, exclusion and dispossession… (p.56) (− Vol))

Sanders et al. (2017, Indonesia)

… we don’t want to accept it because it is too difficult… (p.75)

… a lack of learning from local wisdom was a key grievance… (p. 75) (-T)

 

It seems that we are working for UNDP rather than independently… (p.76)

… local actors tended to see themselves as subjects of controlled lab experiments or guinea pigs, rather than having agency of control of their options… (p.76) (− Vol)

Howson (2018, Indonesia)

Some farmers do not understand money. When they get it, they spend it on silly things. They get into trouble sometimes. (p.140) (− Fin)

Women were included in the project yet the construction of alternative livelihoods … concreting the essentialist dichotomies of masculinity and femininity. (p.142). (− Eq)

…incentives from a REDD + project… are a sort of ecological ransom… (p.143) (− Vol)

Enrici and Hubacek (2018, Indonesia)

People that are typically involved in REDD have very little business experience. So… the only people who have succeeded are primarily people who have business experience

But I see people here, they get money from the clouds and they spend it, because it’s not theirs. (on-line reference) (− Fin)

 

You’re going around bothering people all the time… … they are so fatigued… they’re like ‘please go away’. (on-line reference) (− Vol)

Boer (2018, Indonesia)

Spatial planning operates as an instrument of… demarcation, specifying zones where certain forest activities are permitted and others prohibited. (p. 8)

Forest Management Units operate through a local statutory body that has the authority to plan and regulate all activities in the forest area… (p.8) (− C)

 

… the state has operated… for political and business elites to exploit forests for private gain. (p. 10) (− P)

Muttaqin et al. (2019, Indonesia)

communities face constraints… (1) limited funds; (2) lack of skills and knowledge; (3) limited access to resources (on-line reference) (− C)

Traditional forest management institutions need to be formally recognised, enhanced and strengthened (on-line reference) (− T)

  

Boer (2019, Indonesia)

 

…lack of inclusion of community input

in the project design; and all activities were externally designed and

pre-planned with no room for community members to provide feedback (p.176) (− Eq)

 

Saeedet al. (2018, Ghana)

The technical nature of REDD + … removed from the understanding and involvement of local stakeholders. (p.56) (− T)

Ghana’s readiness process has not been able to establish what the risks and benefits are for each stakeholder group. (p.56) (− Fin)

… the FC REDD + unit reportedly goes… out of the way to look for those who have been left out and bring them on-board. (p.52) (+ Inc)

 

Wallbott and Rosendal (2018, Costa Rica)

… pressure for early action… challenges the … knowledge transfer mechanisms… (p.116) (− T)

… it is difficult for small property holders to access money on the carbon markets… (p.117) (− Fin)

  

Guadalupe et al. (2018, Brazil)

The state of Amapa is still struggling with key aspects of REDD + monitoring. (p.1) (− T)

  

West (2015, Brazil)

Potentially the greatest achievement … was the successful development of a financial mechanism to secure equitable REDD + revenue allocation (p11) (+ Fin)

… the community was found to be mostly engaged with the project’s goals and strategies

It is clear that the role played by partner NGOs was fundamental for the design and engagement of the indigenous group…

(p.11)(+ Tr)

The 5% of community members who did not support the REDD + projects were mainly from one village that still profited from illegal logging. These individuals also refused to participate in the interviews… (p.11) (− P)

Nathan and Pasgaard (2017, Cambodia)

We waited so long to get carbon funding, some of my members feel hopeless… and nothing happens… (p.33)

… the project proved risky… due to false expectations… (p.33) (− Fin)

…the main actual on-the-ground activity was to involve local people in forest patrols… may have helped protect the forested areas… (p.32) (+ C)

… the committee and members who are active will get benefits… (p.34) (− Eq)

There are many benefits from forest management. Many people can access NTFPs… (p.34) (+ P)

Work (2018, Cambodia)

…not enough money though. It doesn’t replace money we can make doing other things, so it’s hard to get people to patrol. (p.257) (− Fin)

 

…if we keep the forest they will help us—if not, they won’t. (p.257) (-Vol)

Samndong et al. (2018, DR Congo)

 

The relationship between political and economic actors in the DRC are…client-patron relationships… (p.9)

These forestry officers supplement their low salaries through bribery and corruption. (p.9) (− Eq)

 

Gauthier (2018, DR Congo)

… the minimum objective of not aggravating the situation of indigenous peoples … is not achieved. (p.10) (− C)

 

… the initiatives pursued will tend to favour the emergence of private actors, reduce the benefits of the poorest people… (p. 10) (− P)

Pelletier et al. (2018, DR Congo)

(Tree planting) could eventually limit land for leasing to landless people who depend on it their livelihoods. (p.112) (− Fin)

  

Holmes et al. (2018, Panama)

  

I am the one weeding my garden in the hot sun… why should the carbon project renovate the community meeting house (p.235) (− Vol)

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Baynes, J., Lovell, G.P. & Herbohn, J. Psychological outcomes of REDD + projects: evidence from country case studies. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change 26, 14 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-021-09951-8

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