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Knowledge, Democracy, and the Internet

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Abstract

The internet has considerably changed epistemic practices in science as well as in everyday life. Apparently, this technology allows more and more people to get access to a huge amount of information. Some people even claim that the internet leads to a democratization of knowledge. In the following text, we will analyze this statement. In particular, we will focus on a potential change in epistemic structure. Does the internet change our common epistemic practice to rely on expert opinions? Does it alter or even undermine the division of epistemic labor? The epistemological framework of our investigation is a naturalist-pragmatist approach to knowledge. We take it that the internet generates a new environment to which people seeking information must adapt. How can they, and how should they, expand their repertory of social markers to continue the venture of filtering, and so make use of the possibilities the internet apparently provides? To find answers to these questions we will take a closer look at two case studies. The first example is about the internet platform WikiLeaks that allows so-called whistle-blowers to anonymously distribute their information. The second case study is about the search engine Google and the problem of personalized searches. Both instances confront a knowledge-seeking individual with particular difficulties which are based on the apparent anonymity of the information distributor. Are there ways for the individual to cope with this problem and to make use of her social markers in this context nonetheless?

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Patricia H. Kelso

Notes

  1. Daniel Jacob and Manuel Thomas (2014) critically discuss the internet’s potential as a medium of communication on political democratization (see also the APUZ 62(7) 2012 and Ferdinand 2000).

  2. He discusses this in his blog on http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2009/11/a-speculative-post-on-the-idea-of-algorithmic-authority/, accessed September 28 2015.

  3. Our focus is on epistemological claims only. Analyzing the political dimension would deserve an article of its own. Readers interested in the latter topic will find a good starting point for further investigations in Cass R. Sunstein's work (see e.g. 2007, 2008) and Marianne Kneuer's edited volume (2013) on the topic.

  4. Here we are thinking in terms of direct democracy. The analogy breaks down with respect to representative democracy, since the experts might serve as the representatives who make the decisions. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us.

  5. The USA allows internet sites to offer medical advice, and some sites are associated with prominent hospitals and medical schools (the Mayo Clinic, Johns Hopkins, and so forth); other sites have a less distinguished background. In other countries, the law discourages physicians and hospitals from offering diagnostic suggestions, since if a diagnosis leads to unfortunate results, the site responsible for it would be legally liable.

  6. For an illuminating account of children’s learning from others, see (Harris 2012). Our treatment of this topic has been aided by conversations between one of us (Kitcher) and Dorothy Chen.

  7. This process of knowledge acquisition is explained in detail by Edward Craig (1990). He emphasizes that an inquirer or “seeker,” as we shall call her, is in need of some detectable indicator property which tells her that a potential informant will tell her the truth as to whether that p or not (see ibid., 26f.). This kind of indicator is exactly what our “markers” are supposed to provide.

  8. A crucial exception in this context is Ludwik Fleck (1979, orig. 1935). He has pointed out the relevance of practical training in science to teach students how to perceive correctly, i.e., in accordance with the prevalent thought style (see also his paper “To Look, to See, to Know” 1986, orig. 1947).

  9. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison offer an exceptionally illuminating overview of how scientists learn how to observe (see Daston and Galison 2007).

  10. Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice (2010) elaborately shows how these mechanisms of the acquisition of social markers can also lead to the marginalization of particular groups of people as epistemic agents.

  11. Although we allude here to the famous (notorious?) “No Miracles” argument for scientific realism, we are not committing ourselves to any realist stance. Successful intervention is simply seen as a measure of progress, without supposing progress to be connected with the discovery of (correspondence) truth. Our approach is thus neutral between the positions adopted in (Laudan 1981), (Kitcher 1993) and (Mößner 2012, 2013).

  12. In our usage, “information” marks out items of potential knowledge. It may contain opinions about certain topics as well as neutral data.

  13. Just consider how many “friends” people claim to have on Facebook and, accordingly, how the concept of friendship has shifted in these contexts.

  14. At first glance it might seem indifferent in epistemological terms whether we receive wrong information by people who deceive intentionally or just for the fun of it. Nonetheless, it seems worthwhile noticing that it is only through the advent of internet technology that attempts of the latter kind increased in number as to become worthy of epistemic consideration.

  15. Take as an example the boy who used to regularly write Wikipedia entries to train his fictional writing capabilities (see Magnus 2009: 77).

  16. On photographs as scientific evidence, see also Mößner (2013).

  17. Karen Frost-Arnold (2014) offers an interesting discussion of anonymity on the internet. She does not, however, make the distinction between anonymity and epistemic opacity that we consider important here. We are grateful to a referee who urged us to be clear about this distinction.

  18. Although it has to be added that it still depends on your local background how much information is really available to you. People in China, for example, still have to face massive governmental censorship and, as a more general difficulty, particular language skills are required to access international websites.

  19. There are, for example, attempts to offer automatic translations (see https://translate.google.com/, accessed December 14 2014) and also keyboards to write and read internet sites in braille.

  20. For information on this topic, see https://wikileaks.org/About.html, accessed September 27 2015.

  21. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making us aware of these developments.

  22. It has to be added, however, that Simon suggested the implementation of marking processes based on algorithms, whereas the processes established are not automatically performed but still depend on users' reviews.

  23. Sanger describes the qualitative development of many Wikipedia articles in the following way: “Over the long term, the quality of a given Wikipedia article will do a random walk around the highest level of quality permitted by the most persistent and aggressive people who follow an article” (Sanger 2009: 64).

  24. Basing our reliance on processes instead of people's trustworthiness with respect to web content is also suggested by Simon (2010).

  25. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMqc7PCJ-nc, accessed December 16 2014.

  26. This problem is also discussed by Boaz Miller and Isaac Record (2013), though they do not take into account the distinction between explicit and implicit personalization.

  27. A similar suggestion is put forward by Simon (2010). The focus of her proposal, however, are so-called recommendation systems such as Tripadvisor and not search engines such as Google (see ibid.: 353f.).

  28. At least as long as we are not concerned with open source products where normally economic profit is not the driving force behind providing and developing software.

  29. Or, at least, citizens should want such a plurality of opinions when being engaged in democratic decision-making, for example.

  30. Richard Stallman explains in “The GNU Project” what the initial motivation to engage in a non-commercial collaborative project was (see https://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.en.html, accessed December 14 2014). Most of all, he points out that such projects shall enable competent people to develop software and tools that fit their needs and interests which is only possible if they have free access to the source code.

  31. The most famous example in this context might be the open source software LINUX. The beginning of this huge project by Linus Torvalds is documented on https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/comp.os.minix/dlNtH7RRrGA[1-25], accessed December 14 2014.

  32. A first-hand description of the developmental process is offered by Stallman (see https://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.en.html, accessed December 14 2014).

  33. On the notion of hacking, see also Stallman (https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html, accessed December 14 2014).

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their extremely constructive comments on an earlier version. Philip Kitcher wishes to thank Wendy Doniger and (especially) M for information about the history of Doniger’s Wikipedia entry. Nicola Mößner’s work was supported by a fellowship within the Postdoc-Program of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

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Correspondence to Nicola Mößner.

Appendix: Wendy Doniger and Wikipedia: A Case Study

Appendix: Wendy Doniger and Wikipedia: A Case Study

Wendy Doniger, Mircea Eliade Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Religions at the University of Chicago, is internationally known for her studies of Hinduism and of mythology. Today, in 2016, she has a perfectly normal Wikipedia page, one that begins by listing some of her many achievements.

It was not ever thus. In 2009, Doniger’s Wikipedia page looked very different. A “Background” section offered a very brief outline of her career. The bulk of the page consisted in a “Criticism” section, consisting of quotations from various commentaries. According to the passages cited, Doniger was “known for being crude, rude and very lewd in the hallowed portals of Sanskrit Academics.” Her translations from Sanskrit were characterized as “unreliable and idiosyncratic.” The entry placed Doniger in a virtual pillory.

People who read it got the message. One of them had a friend – someone we’ll call M – who had long been interested in Hinduism and who had profited from reading some of Doniger’s books. M recommended Doniger to others with similar interests, and was told that Doniger was “very controversial.” The Wikipedia page was cited as the authority.

So, in 2009, M looked at that page. M also looked at the comparable pages for other plainly controversial figures – political leaders, for example. None of them showed the same lack of balance. Appalled by Wikipedia’s complete silence about the many accomplishments that had earned Doniger an enviable international reputation, M decided to write to her about the page. Having recently – temporarily – retired after a successful business career, M volunteered to work on fixing the page. Doniger responded by explaining that others had already tried to do so, and that the venture was hopeless. Corrections were always quickly taken down, so that the page reverted to the hatchet job M had read.

In 2009, Doniger’s work was the focus of a huge controversy. That year, Viking/Penguin had published The Hindus: An Alternative History, in which Doniger looked at Hinduism from the perspectives of outsiders, rather than presenting the orthodox vision of the Brahmin authors who had previously defined it. The book received highly positive reviews in many places, and was a finalist for a National Book Critics Circle award. In India, however, it was subjected to vitriolic denunciations, especially in the blogosphere, and Penguin/India eventually agreed to withdraw the book from circulation. (In fact, many copies continued to be sold, usually under plain wrappers, and the book was eventually republished in India by another company.)

Although M was aware of all this, the extreme mischaracterization on the Wikipedia page provoked a resolution to set things right. M spent a month researching Doniger’s career, and constructed a careful biography, deliberately neutral in its tone. The biography was sent to Doniger, who approved it – although she continued to believe in the impossibility of setting the record straight.

On August 4 2009, M entered the lists, writing under the pseudonym meetoohelp. Correction began with the insertion of a more complete list of Doniger’s publications. That was followed with the biography, and some other amendments to the Wikipedia page, in particular a more balanced collection of comments from reviewers of her work.

M’s last alteration was submitted at 2.54 p.m., 26 minutes after the first correction had been entered. Less than a minute later, another interested party, Priyanath, deleted everything M had submitted. Patiently, M reinserted the material, responding to the reason Priyanath had given for the bulk deletion. From 5.30 p.m. until early the next morning, the exchange is comical – Priyanath takes away, and M puts back. M is consistently courteous, showing a restraint rarely found on the internet.

By August 6, the page seemed to have stabilized. M’s interventions had decisively altered the original tone, offering a more accurate picture of Doniger’s work, the praise it had received and the criticisms leveled against it. Priyanath had apparently settled on making smaller changes. The page continued to be revised by Goethean, another Doniger champion, who attended to many details. Then in October 2009, Spdiffy launched a series of modifications, aimed at reverting to a negative picture of Doniger’s work.

At this point, M and Goethean joined forces to turn back the latest challenge. Plainly, however, the passions aroused by Doniger’s work would be expressed in further attempts to undermine her credibility. M had decided to return to work, and would no longer have the time to monitor the page at the required frequency. Learning from Doniger that the University of Chicago had a small fund available to enable its faculty to hire assistants for scholarly purposes, M proposed that Goethean be enlisted to keep an accurate page up to date; if the funds were inadequate to cover all the hours Goethean would have to devote to the task, M volunteered to make up the difference.

The arrangement has worked. Doniger’s current Wikipedia page provides a reasonably accurate account of who she is and what she has done. But maintaining it has been an enormous struggle.

How does this episode bear on the issues about epistemic democracy that have been our central concern? First, it shows how democratic exchanges can lead to the construction of a reliable channel of information. Even without the invocation of official experts – hordes of Sanskritists and specialists in Hinduism testifying to some account of Doniger’s achievements – the page eventually stabilized on something informative and accurate. But it also shows how chancy the process was. Without M’s persistence and – unusual – politeness, Priyanath, Spdiffy, and others who followed them might easily have carried the day. Without Goethean’s constant hard work, and, behind it, the support provided by the University of Chicago and (potentially) by M, Doniger’s opponents could surely have chipped away around the edges (at very least). The success depends on highly unusual background conditions.

Even before the controversy about Doniger’s page, Wikipedia had rules about writing “Biographies of Living Persons.” They were an attempt to provide something like a constitutional protection against character assassination, by setting limits to what the “citizens” (the contributors) could do. As far as we can tell, the version of the page Priyanath, Spdiffy and their successors wanted to retain was in clear violation of the rules. It still took a determined effort to produce a more balanced account of Doniger’s intellectual contributions.

We see this case as supporting the main conclusions of our essay. The epistemic democratization offered by the internet is a conservative extension of the existing division of epistemic labor. But we see a thorough survey of examples like this one as a potential route to going further than we have done. A study of a variety of instances in which what is found at a particular site is shaped by protracted struggles among parties with incompatible views, might help improve the epistemic democracy the internet has so far provided.

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Mößner, N., Kitcher, P. Knowledge, Democracy, and the Internet. Minerva 55, 1–24 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-016-9310-0

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