Abstract
I examine the abstraction/representation theory of computation put forward by Horsman et al., connecting it to the broader notion of modeling, and in particular, model-based explanation, as considered by Rosen. I argue that the ‘representational entities’ it depends on cannot themselves be computational, and that, in particular, their representational capacities cannot be realized by computational means, and must remain explanatorily opaque to them. I then propose that representation might be realized by subjective experience (qualia), through being the bearer of the structure of abstract objects that are represented.
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Acknowledgements
I warmly thank Peter Hankins and two anonymous referees for comments and criticism on earlier versions of many of the arguments presented here.
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Szangolies, J. The Abstraction/Representation Account of Computation and Subjective Experience. Minds & Machines 30, 259–299 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09522-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09522-x