Minds and Machines

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 605–622 | Cite as

The Swapping Constraint

  • Henry Ian SchillerEmail author


Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same computational state.


Computational triviality Computational theory of mind Finite state automata Computational implementation 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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