Intervening on the Causal Exclusion Problem for Integrated Information Theory
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the causal framework within which integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness makes it claims. We argue that, in its current formulation, IIT is threatened by the causal exclusion problem. Some proponents of IIT have attempted to thwart the causal exclusion problem by arguing that IIT has the resources to demonstrate genuine causal emergence at macro scales. In contrast, we argue that their proposed solution to the problem is damagingly circular as a result of inter-defining information and causation. As a solution, we propose that IIT should adopt the specific interventionist causal framework that we offer and show how IIT can harness this interventionist framework to avoid the causal exclusion problem. We demonstrate how our argument remains fully compatible with the methodology, empirical data, and conceptual aims of the theory.
Keywords
Integrated information theory Interventionism Active counterfactuals Consciousness Causal exclusion Downward exclusionNotes
Acknowledegements
We would like to thank Larissa Albantakis, Philip Goff, Anna Kocsis, Michele Luchetti, and Carlos Montemayor for helpful comments and advice on previous drafts. Thank you to the audience of the 5th WFAP conference at the University of Vienna, at which we presented an earlier version of this paper. Thanks to three anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and suggestions. The author ordering is solely alphabetical, all work towards the development of this paper was equally shared.
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