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Notes
Klein explains his somewhat idiosyncratic use of the terms “epistemological” and “ontological” in chapter 1, but nothing of substance turns on this terminological choice.
Moreover, the immaterialist picture of the self will inherit basic difficulties afflicting non-materialist views in general. Klein refrains from entering into the details of debates over specific versions of substance dualism, property dualism, and so on. This decision is understandable, as detailed discussion of such debates would be out of place in a book on the self. Nevertheless, anyone who defends a form of non-materialism ultimately owes us a concrete characterization of the metaphysics of the non-material. How, for example, is the sense of ownership described in chapter 5 supposed to accomplish the impressive feat of relating the ontological self to the epistemological self, given that the former is immaterial and the latter is material?
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Michaelian, K. Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Minds & Machines 25, 119–122 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-014-9344-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-014-9344-8