Minds and Machines

, Volume 24, Issue 3, pp 307–325 | Cite as

The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information

  • Simon D’AlfonsoEmail author


In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske’s account of information flow.


Dretske Information Knowledge Closure Relevant alternatives 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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