Minds and Machines

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 3–17

Yes, She Was!

Reply to Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room”
Article

Abstract

Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room” claims that my argument in “How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room” fails because Searle and I use the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ differently, hence are at cross purposes. Ford has misunderstood me; this reply clarifies my theory.

Keywords

Chinese room argument Syntactic semantics Searle 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkBuffaloUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkBuffaloUSA
  3. 3.Department of LinguisticsUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkBuffaloUSA
  4. 4.Center for Cognitive ScienceUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkBuffaloUSA

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