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Illness as the saturated phenomenon: the contribution of Jean-Luc Marion

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Abstract

During the last few decades, many thinkers have advocated for the importance of the phenomenological approach in developing the understanding of the lived experience of illness. In their attempts, they have referred to ideas found in the history of phenomenology, most notably, in the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The aim of this paper is to sketch out an interpretation of illness based on a yet unexplored conceptual framework of the phenomenology of French thinker Jean-Luc Marion. Focusing on concepts of the saturated phenomenon and flesh, the paper develops an interpretation of illness as the saturated phenomenon, which highlights a variety of dimensions of illness already elaborated within the phenomenology of medicine, such as the affective dimension of illness, the disruptive dimension of illness, the transformed perception of the self in illness, mineness of flesh in illness and the inexpressible and hermeneutical dimension of illness. In addition to that, the paper explores some of the consequences the proposed interpretation of illness offers regarding the nature of illness and health. It is argued that illness in its essence is very similar to the experience of other saturated phenomena, suggesting that the difference between them does not lie within the character of the affective givenness, but rather within the dynamic relationship between the affective givenness and its conceptualization. It is also shown that the experience of health is compatible with the experience of saturation and thus is not limited to the tacit and harmonious background state.

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Notes

  1. In order to illustrate the disruptive aspect of illness, many phenomenologists of medicine also use Heidegger’s discussion of the tool breakdown as well (Leder 1990, p. 33, 84; Svenaeus 2000b, pp. 129–130; Aho and Aho 2009, pp. 104–107; Carel 2016, pp. 60–63).

  2. This does not mean that phenomenologists of medicine inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology completely disregard the role of the affective dimension of embodiment in illness (see, for example, Leder 1990, pp. 83–99). Neither does it mean that they have ignored the fact that illness influences the whole world of the sick person, not only her body (Toombs 1988, p. 207; Leder 1992, p. 4; Carel 2016, p. 92). Svenaeus maintains that “the difference between the two approaches is mainly one of emphasis and terminology, since the version found in Leder, Toombs and Carel certainly also involves the life-world matters and existential themes present in Gadamer, Aho and Svenaeus” (2017, p. 5).

  3. Although Marion has not explicitly written about illness, his concept of the saturated phenomenon has been developed with an aim to understand experiences which, within phenomenological tradition, have been left to the margins of ordinary phenomenality or have been excluded by it (Marion 2008b, p. 120).

  4. In defining the saturated phenomenon, Marion refers to the possible relations between the constitutive elements of any phenomenon, namely, intuition and intention. According to him, only two options between these elements have been considered within the history of phenomenology—an adequation between intention and intuition (in the case of ideal objects) and an inadequation between them resulting from a lack of intuition in relation to intention (in the case of a perception of a thing) (Marion 2008a, p. 27). He proposes another alternative—an inadequation between intuition and intention, resulting from the excess of intuition.

  5. Marion is using the term la chair (translated in English as flesh), instead of the terms corps vécu or corps propre (translated in English as lived body), in order to emphasize the nonintentional character of the experienced body (2002a, p. 88). In doing so, he is developing Husserl’s insights about Leib as a bearer of sensations, instead of focusing on Leib as the embodied consciousness of “I can.”

  6. The work is cited using Michael Tweeds translation (Henry 2008).

  7. This does not mean, however, that intentional horizon is closed. As Husserl has pointed out: “The predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure. For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already “construed” in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open” (1982, p. 45 italics in original).

  8. It is precisely because of this aspect that Marion describes intentional activity as a mastery and control of the subject.

  9. Even though the disruptive character of illness rests upon the affective character of illness (for example, my inability to read rests upon the headache or anxiety), one has to allow for the possibility that the affective character of illness can be reinforced by the disruptive character of illness (for example, my inability to read can intensify my anxiety or even my headache).

  10. In describing the lived-experience of depression, Aho has also suggested that it is necessary to rethink the existentialist concept of the self, which includes the free ability of meaning-giving. According to him: “In cases of severe depression, our capacity to interpret and give meaning to our experience can be compromised to such an extent that the very conception of selfhood and agency can be called into question” (2013, p. 753).

  11. Even though Marion seems to suggest that the objectifying gaze, which he connects to controlling and mastery of the subject, is less preferable than the openness to the event of the givenness of affections, I am avoiding any normative claims regarding the most preferable attitude towards illness. It should be noted that even though most of the strategies of pain management are built upon the objectification of pain, there are examples in literature indicating that people who are suffering pain can be helped if they merge with their pain (Bullington 2009, p. 107).

  12. In explaining the inexpressible character of pain, Elaine Scarry in her book Body in Pain offers a similar line of thought. She points out that pain resists objectification in language precisely because it is a nonintentional phenomenon (1985, p. 5).

  13. The inability to grasp the affective givenness in illness as well as its demand to be grasped rest upon the idea that in illness one experiences an excess of nonconceptual affections. It could be argued, however, that in some forms of illness one experiences a lack of affections. For example, a major depressive disorder can be experienced as a loss of affectivity, which results in the lack of feelings or emotions (Aho 2013). I would agree that the proposed account of illness applies best to the cases when one is overwhelmed with affective givenness (feelings, emotions, sensations etc.). Nevertheless, Marion’s phenomenology offers a possibility to think about the experiential lack of affectivity as well. Marion has pointed out that the excess of affective givenness (pain, suffering etc.) may become so strong that at one point it becomes unbearable for the gaze. He uses an analogy with bedazzlemen—as the very strong light is blinding, leading to the impossibility of seeing, so the very strong affections are ‘blinding’, leading to the impossibility of bearing them (2008a, p. 36). In the presence of a very strong affective givenness, any activity on the part of the subject, including the possibility of receiving the affective givenness, may become nonexistent. This line of thought, however, requires a further elaboration.

  14. Carel here refers to the work by Victoria Sweet (2006).

  15. The exception to the attempts at interpretation/conceptualization, which are evoked by the affective givenness, can be found in cases of a very strong affective givenness, when the activity of the subject is overwhelmed to the point of being annihilated (Marion 2008a, p. 36). This could be seen in cases of a very strong pain, for example.

  16. The importance of the horizon of disease in one’s experience of illness suggests that phenomenological approach to illness can and must integrate some of the aspects from naturalistic theories of disease (for comparison between phenomenological and naturalistic theories of health and illness see: Svenaeus 2013).

  17. The experience of other saturated phenomena may also be unwelcome and/or enduring (for example, the experience of grief or the experience of pain), but it may not evoke the sense of the disturbance in the biological functions of one’s body, namely, the horizon of disease. If it does, it appears as illness.

  18. This is the reference to the concept of health developed by Fredrik Svenaeus. He writes: “Health, in contrast to this [to illness], consists in a homelike being-in-the-world. Homelikeness is supposed to catch the character of the normal, unapparent, transparency of everyday activities, not of feeling happy” (2013, pp. 233–234 italics in original).

  19. Marion’s idea about the degrees of saturation, namely, the idea that we do not always experience the saturation with equal intensity, explains the fact that sometimes it is easy to miss the saturation. If the affective givenness is not very strong (for example, in cases of minor illnesses or pain), it is possible to mobilize one’s conceptual capacities and avoid the disruption of the meaning-structures of the world and the self. Sometimes, however, it is impossible to do so. If the affective givenness is very strong, it may overwhelm the capacities of the subject to the point of radically transforming or even annihilating the meaning-structures of the world and the self. Taking into account the fact that this applies to all saturated phenomena, it is possible to imagine a situation when the experience of the saturated phenomenon of illness has less impact on one’s being-in-the-world than the experience of the saturated phenomenon of desire or God’s presence, for example and vice versa.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for most valuable comments and suggestions.

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Funding was provided by University of Latvia (Grant No. Y5-AZ82-ZFN-905).

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Correspondence to Māra Grīnfelde.

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Grīnfelde, M. Illness as the saturated phenomenon: the contribution of Jean-Luc Marion. Med Health Care and Philos 22, 71–83 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-9843-0

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