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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 137–149 | Cite as

Can the Dead be Brought into Disrepute?

  • Malin MastertonEmail author
  • Mats G. Hansson
  • Anna T. Höglund
  • Gert Helgesson
Article

Abstract

Queen Christina of Sweden was unconventional in her time, leading to hypotheses on her gender and possible hermaphroditic nature. If genetic analysis can substantiate the latter claim, could this bring the queen into disrepute 300 years after her death? Joan C. Callahan has argued that if a reputation changes, this constitutes a change only in the group of people changing their views and not in the person whose reputation it is. Is this so?

This paper analyses what constitutes change and draws out the implications to the reputation of the dead. It is argued that a reputation is a relational property which can go through changes. The change is “real” for the group changing their views on Queen Christina and of a Cambridge kind for the long dead queen herself. Cambridge changes result in new properties being acquired, some of which can be of significance.

Although the dead cannot go through any non-relational changes, it is possible for the dead to change properties through Cambridge changes. In this sense changes in reputation do affect the dead, and thus Queen Christina can acquire a new property, in this case possibly a worse reputation.

Keywords

Callahan, Joan C. Cambridge change posthumous change relational change relational properties 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Malin Masterton
    • 1
    Email author
  • Mats G. Hansson
    • 1
  • Anna T. Höglund
    • 1
  • Gert Helgesson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department for Public Health and Caring SciencesCentre for Bioethics at Uppsala University & Karolinska InstitutetUppsalaSweden

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