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The Embryo Rescue Case

Abstract

In the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders. In this paper, I argue that the Embryo Rescue Case does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders.

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Correspondence to S. Matthew Liao.

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Liao, S.M. The Embryo Rescue Case. Theor Med Bioeth 27, 141–147 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-005-1390-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-005-1390-z

Keywords

  • embryo
  • moral status
  • persons
  • potentiality
  • rights
  • time-relative interest