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Epistemology without concepts?

Penelope Maddy: What do philosophers do? Skepticism and the practice of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xi+248pp, $29.95 HB

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References

  • Austin, John L. 1956. “A plea for excuses,” reprinted in J. L. Austin: Philosophical papers, eds. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, 175–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

  • Grice, Paul. 1967. “Logic and conversation,” reprinted in his Studies in the way of words, 1–143. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

  • Stroud, Barry. 1984. The significance of philosophical skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Stroud, Barry. 1996. “Epistemological reflection on knowledge of the external world,” reprinted in his Understanding human knowledge, 122–138. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Correspondence to Santiago Echeverri.

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Echeverri, S. Epistemology without concepts?. Metascience 27, 117–121 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-017-0263-1

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