Epistemology without concepts?
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What do philosophers do? Penelope Maddy sets out to answer this question in this lucid and enjoyable book—a collection of her Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa lectures. In a nutshell: philosophers investigate “questions without a home in any other discipline” (220). Maddy focuses on one perennial philosophical question: How do we come to know anything at all about the world around us? This question has often led philosophers to embrace some form of skepticism. Maddy tries to show how the methods employed by philosophers like John Austin, G. E. Moore, Thomas Reid, and Ludwig Wittgenstein can be fruitfully used to avoid the skeptical conclusion. Maddy revisits two skeptical arguments: The Dream Argument (Chapter 1) and The Argument from Illusion (Chapter 2). The Infinite Regress of Justification and the Closure Argument are briefly presented in two appendices. Chapter 3 knits together the results from previous chapters and addresses the deontological question: What shouldphilosophers do?...
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