Metascience

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 491–495 | Cite as

Powers, laws and freedom of the will

Steven Horst: Laws, mind, and free will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, 277pp, $36.00 HB
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sage School of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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