Equilibrium Joining Strategy in a Batch Transfer Queuing System with Gated Policy

Abstract

In this paper, strategic behavior of passengers in a batch transfer queuing system with gated policy under complete information is investigated. Two solutions are used to solve the stationary distribution of the system. Particularly, suppose that arriving passengers have the opportunity to observe all information of the system upon arrival, we derive equilibrium joining strategy of passengers under this information when passengers fall into the dilemma of joining or balking. We prove that the equilibrium joining strategy is a threshold type, but when some parameters change, it may be changed. Under the equilibrium strategy of threshold type of the observable case, we give the parameterized expected total net social benefit function. Finally, a number of numerical experiments on equilibrium social benefit with respect to several parameters are presented, which are used to explore the theoretical results of the system and compare observable case and unobservable case of the system.