Advertisement

Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 50, Issue 4, pp 429–452 | Cite as

The logic of comprehensive or deep emotional change

  • Jeremy Barris
Article
  • 454 Downloads

Abstract

The article proposes an analogue of conceptual change in the context of comprehensive or deep emotional change and growth, and explores some aspects of its logic in that context. This is not to reduce emotions to concepts, but to say that concepts express the sense that is already inherent in experience and reality. When emotional states change so thoroughly that their applicable concepts become completely different, they shift from one logical structure to another. At the moment or phase when one conceptual structure transforms into another, two logically incompatible descriptions both apply to the same state at the same time. As a result, the correct description of this moment and its development involves conceptual confusion, non sequitur, and logical contradiction. In these contexts, the sense itself of the emotional experience and process is partly characterized by what are otherwise violations of sense. Failure of sense is part of how these experiences make sense. The article explores some of the consequences of this paradox of sense for the nature and experience of deep emotional change and for the meaning of change itself in this context.

Keywords

Emotions Logic Sense Emotional development Emotional change Confusion Paradox 

References

  1. Barris, Jeremy. 2003. Paradox and the possibility of knowledge: The example of psychoanalysis. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Barris, Jeremy. 2014. Dreams as a meta-conceptual or existential experience. Philosophia 42: 625–644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Barris, Jeremy. 2015a. Metaphysics, deep pluralism, and paradoxes of informal logic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23: 59–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Barris, Jeremy. 2015b. Sometimes always true: Undogmatic pluralism in politics, metaphysics, and epistemology. New York: Fordham University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Baltas, Aristides. 2007. Background “assumptions” and the grammar of conceptual change: Rescuing Kuhn by means of Wittgenstein. In Re-framing the conceptual change approach in learning and instruction, ed. Stella Vosniadou, Aristides Baltas, and Xenia Vamvakoussi. Oxford: Elsevier.Google Scholar
  6. Braud, William, and Rosemarie Anderson (eds.). 1998. Transpersonal research methods for the social sciences: Honoring human experience. London: Sage.Google Scholar
  7. Bremer, Manuel. 2005. An introduction to paraconsistent logics. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  8. Carey, Susan. 1985. Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  9. Collingwood, R.G. 1940. An essay on metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  10. Davidson, David. 1984. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  11. Deleuze. Gilles. 1990. The logic of sense. Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Derrida, Jacques. 1996. The gift of death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Dewey, John. 1938. Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Co.Google Scholar
  14. Feyerabend, Paul. 1993. Against method, 3rd ed. London: Verso.Google Scholar
  15. Giegerich, Wolfgang. 2007. The soul’s logical life. New York: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  16. Hall, Everett W. 1960. Philosophical systems: A categorial analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  17. Hart, Tobin, Peter L. Nelson, and Kaisa Puhakka (eds.). 2000. Transpersonal knowing: Exploring the horizon of consciousness. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  18. Heidegger, Martin. 1994. Basic questions of philosophy: Selected “problems” of “logic”. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Johnstone Jr., Henry W. 1978. Validity and rhetoric in philosophical argument: An outlook in transition. University Park, PA: The Dialogue Press of Man and World.Google Scholar
  20. Kegan, Robert. 1994. In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  22. Lyotard, Jean-François. 1988. The different: Phrases in dispute. Trans. G. Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  23. MacIntyre, Alasdaire C. 1988. Whose justice? Which rationality?. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
  24. Ortega y Gasset, José. 2002. What is knowledge? Edited and translated by Jorge García-Gómez. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  25. Paul, L.A. 2015. Transformative experience. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  26. Pearce, W.Barnett, and Stephen W. Littlejohn. 1997. Moral conflict: When social worlds collide. London: Sage.Google Scholar
  27. Peirce, Charles S. 1958. Issues of pragmaticism. In Charles S. Peirce: Selected writings, ed. Philip P. Weiner. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
  28. Priest, Graham. 2001. An introduction to non-classical logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Priest, Graham. 2002. Beyond the limits of thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Putnam, Hilary. 1990. Truth and convention. In Realism with a human face, ed. James Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Vosniadou, Stella (ed.). 2013. International handbook of research on conceptual change, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  32. Vosniadou, Stella, Aristides Baltas, and Xenia Vamvakoussi (eds.). 2007. Re-framing the conceptual change approach in learning and instruction. Oxford: Elsevier.Google Scholar
  33. Winch, Peter. 1964. Understanding a primitive society. American Philosophical Quarterly 1: 307–324.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentMarshall UniversityHuntingtonUSA

Personalised recommendations