Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 133–151 | Cite as

CEO characteristics and firm valuation: a quantile regression analysis

  • Pascal Nguyen
  • Nahid Rahman
  • Ruoyun Zhao


This study investigates the effects of three highly-visible CEO characteristics on firm valuation. Using a sample of 2702 observations for Australian firms over the period 2001–2011, we find that CEO age is uniformly associated with lower firm valuation. CEO tenure is also associated with lower valuation, but more significantly so in the higher quantiles of firm valuation, that is for firms with high-growth opportunities. In contrast, CEO duality is found to be beneficial only for firms with high-growth opportunities. Overall, the study highlights the contingent relationship between CEO characteristics and firm valuation.


CEO characteristics Age Tenure Duality Performance Quantile regression 



We would like to express our deepest gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ESDES Business SchoolCatholic University of LyonLyonFrance
  2. 2.Finance Discipline GroupUniversity of Technology SydneyUltimoAustralia

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