|
Panel A: variance inflation factors of the independent variables used in the original model of post-acquisition performance
| | |
|
Change in holdings of knowledge-intensive institutional investors with regional expertise (β
H2)
|
2.7
|
0.371
|
|
Acquirer debt capacityt−1
|
3.29
|
0.304
|
|
Level of cash of acquirert−1
|
2.84
|
0.352
|
|
Acquirer market to book ratio
|
2.45
|
0.409
|
|
Deal type is tender offer
|
2.2
|
0.455
|
|
Target and acquirer industry relatedness
|
1.79
|
0.558
|
|
All-cash payment dummy
|
1.74
|
0.573
|
|
Initial reaction hostile
|
1.54
|
0.649
|
|
Deal value to market value
|
1.52
|
0.659
|
|
Differences in national laws and regulations (target anti-directors rights)
|
1.52
|
0.660
|
|
Acquirer share turnover
|
1.39
|
0.718
|
|
Mean VIF
|
2.09
| |
|
Panel B: variance inflation factors of the independent variables used in the model of post-acquisition performance with excluded collinear variables
|
|
Change in holdings of knowledge-intensive institutional investors with regional expertise (β
H2)
|
1.31
|
0.764
|
|
Differences in national laws and regulations (target anti-directors rights)
|
1.42
|
0.706
|
|
Deal type is tender offer
|
1.41
|
0.712
|
|
Level of cash of acquirert−1
|
1.34
|
0.748
|
|
Acquirer debt capacityt−1
|
1.33
|
0.754
|
|
Acquirer share turnover
|
1.2
|
0.836
|
|
Target and acquirer industry relatedness
|
1.11
|
0.899
|
|
Mean VIF
|
1.3
| |