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Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to illustrate the characteristics of the Spanish corporate governance system and especially describe the diffusion of each mechanism among listed firms, in comparison with other industrialized countries. In doing so, we identify idiosyncratic traits of the Spanish corporate governance model that points up how the dichotomy between outsider- and insider-oriented models is simplistic and does not fit with the Spanish context. We argue, instead, that corporate governance has evolved in Spain towards a hybrid model that is situated in an intermediate position between the two aforementioned systems. The result of this hybridization is a system characterized by a new role for the state as a regulator, the presence of large blockholders, and a higher free float of capital on the stock market. Still, it is a very weak market for corporate control, and has reduced incorporation of Anglo-Saxon practices such as information transparency, board independence, or variable compensation packages for the management.

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Notes

  1. The IBEX 35 is a capitalization-weighted stock market index, comprised of the 35 most liquid Spanish stocks traded in the continuous market, and is the benchmark index for the Madrid stock-exchange.

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Acknowledgments

We acknowledge with thanks the funding of this project by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant # SEJ2006-01731).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126, 28903, Getafe, Madrid, Spain

    Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca

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  1. Isabel Gutierrez
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  2. Jordi Surroca
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Correspondence to Isabel Gutierrez.

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Gutierrez, I., Surroca, J. Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence. J Manag Gov 18, 989–1017 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9250-5

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