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A cyclical view of the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management

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Abstract

The vast majority of research on the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management focuses on the impact of corporate governance on strategic management. In this article we propose a cyclical model, highlighting that strategic decisions can also affect corporate governance through shaping firm ownership structure. We discuss the impacts of strategic decisions on firm ownership structure and corporate governance in the contexts of publicly traded firms, private firms, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. We hope that our cyclical model can promote researchers to develop a more complete view about the relationships between strategic management, ownership structure, and corporate governance.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, PO Box 874006, Tempe, AZ, 85287-4006, USA

    Wei Shen

  2. Department of Management, School of Business, University of Mississippi, 339 Holman Hall, University, MS, 38677, USA

    Richard J. Gentry

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  1. Wei Shen
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  2. Richard J. Gentry
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Correspondence to Wei Shen.

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Shen, W., Gentry, R.J. A cyclical view of the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management. J Manag Gov 18, 959–973 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9248-z

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