Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 989–1008 | Cite as

CEO duality and agency cost: evidence from Bangladesh

Article

Abstract

This study examines if Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality reduces the firms’ agency cost in Bangladesh. The agency costs are measured as two efficiency ratios: ‘expense ratio’ and ‘asset utilization ratio’. The finding is that, there is no significant relationship between CEO duality and agency costs. These findings imply that, duality may have given the CEOs enormous powers; it may have reduced the check and balance or board’s ability to exercise the governance (monitoring) function, which is not helpful to enhance firm efficiency. This study contributes to the global debate on CEO duality and provides a new avenue of knowledge on CEO duality and firm efficiency in the context of an emerging economy.

Keywords

Agency Theory Bangladesh Board CEO Power Stewardship Theory 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Accounting, Economics and FinanceUniversity of Southern QueenslandToowoombaAustralia

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