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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 715–732 | Cite as

The Representation of Belief

  • Isaac Wilhelm
Article

Abstract

I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott’s axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran’s project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.

Keywords

Formal epistemology Representation theorem Belief Credence Scott’s axiom 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Laura Callahan, Sam Carter, Kevin Dorst, Kenny Easwaran, Frankie Egan, Adam Elga, Danny Forman, Jimmy Goodrich, James Hawthorne, Nevin Johnson, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Schaffer, an anonymous reviewer, and the audience at NASSLLI 2017 for helpful comments. Special thanks are due to Branden Fitelson for all his help, guidance, and support.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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