Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes
Our main goal is to investigate whether the infinitary rules for the quantifiers endorsed by Elia Zardini in a recent paper are plausible. First, we will argue that they are problematic in several ways, especially due to their infinitary features. Secondly, we will show that even if these worries are somehow dealt with, there is another serious issue with them. They produce a truth-theoretic paradox that does not involve the structural rules of contraction.
KeywordsSubstructural logic Infinitary quantifiers Paradoxes Truth
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