Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 513–547 | Cite as

Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief

  • Michael CaieEmail author


In this paper, I argue that some plausible principles concerning which credences are rationally permissible for agents given information about one another’s epistemic and credal states have some surprising consequences for which credences an agent ought to have in light of self-locating information. I provide a framework that allows us to state these constraints and draw out these consequences precisely. I then consider and assess the prospects for rejecting these prima facie plausible principles.


Self-Locating credences Agreement theorems Sleeping beauty puzzle 



Thanks to the audiences at NYU, the Bristol-Groningen Conference in Formal Epistemology and Decisions, Games and Logic 2016, and to Harvey Lederman and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this work.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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