Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 407–418 | Cite as

Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 2: Patterns of Indistinguishability

  • Peter FritzEmail author


The models of contingency in what propositions, properties and relations there are developed in Part 1 are related to models of contingency in what propositions there are due to Robert Stalnaker. It is shown that some but not all of the classes of models of Part 1 agree with Stalnaker’s models concerning the patterns of contingency in what propositions there are they admit. Further structural connections between the two kinds of models are explored.


Contingentism Higher-order modal logic Propositions 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OsloOsloNorway

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