Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 46, Issue 4, pp 405–418 | Cite as

The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision

Article

Abstract

After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a wholesale reduction of iterated to one-shot revision. The present paper offers grounds to hold that these principles should be significantly weakened and that the reductionist thesis should ultimately be rejected. Furthermore, the considerations provided suggest a close connection between the logic of iterated belief change and the logic of evidential relevance.

Keywords

AGM Darwiche-pearl Evidence Iterated belief revision 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer Science and InformaticsCardiff UniversityCardiffUK
  2. 2.Department of Politics and PhilosophyLa Trobe UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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