# Hierarchical Propositions

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## Abstract

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a new hierarchical account that solves the problem.

## Keywords

Propositions Paradox Russell Theory of types## Notes

### Acknowledgments

For comments and discussion, I am grateful to George Bealer, Susanne Bobzien, Justin Khoo, Zoltán Gendler Szabó, audiences at Philosophy Today (Mexico City) and the Society of Exact Philosophy (Ohio State University), and two referees for this journal.

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