Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 27–63 | Cite as

Conditionals in Theories of Truth

  • Anil Gupta
  • Shawn Standefer


We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.


Truth Paradox Revision theory Conditionals Circular definitions 



We presented some of the ideas of this paper in talks given at Carnegie Mellon University, MIT, University of Barcelona, University of Illinois at Chicago, and the UConn Logic Seminar. We wish to thank our audiences for their questions and comments. We are especially grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.University of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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