Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 44, Issue 6, pp 741–753 | Cite as

On the use (and abuse) of Logic in Game Theory

  • Eric PacuitEmail author


A quick glance at the opening paragraphs in many of the classic logic textbooks reveals a common view: Logical methods highlight the reasoning patterns of a single (idealized) agent engaged in some form of mathematical thinking.1 However, this traditional view of the “subject matter” of logic is expanding. There is a growing literature using phrases such as “rational interaction” or “information flow” to describe its subject matter while still employing traditional logical methods. The clearest example of this can be found in the work of Johan van Benthem and others on logical dynamics38, 49, 59]; Rohit Parikh and others on social software [42, 60]; Samson Abramsky and others on game semantics for linear logic [1], and Mike Wooldridge, Valentin Goranko and others on logics for multiagent systems [25, 58, 62]. There are many issues driving this shift in thinking about what logic is about (see [50] for a discussion). One important reason for this shift is the close...


Logic and games Epistemic game theory Epistemic logic 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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