Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 44, Issue 6, pp 651–662 | Cite as

Formal Epistemology

  • Kenny Easwaran

Doxastic Theories

The application of formal tools to questions related to epistemology is of course not at all new. However, there has been a surge of interest in the field now known as “formal epistemology” over the past decade, with two annual conference series (the Formal Epistemology Workshops and the Formal Epistemology Festivals) and an annual summer school at Carnegie Mellon University, in addition to many one-off events devoted to the field. A glance at the programs of these series illustrates the wide-ranging set of topics that have been grouped under this name, ranging from rational choice theory and the foundations of statistics, to logics of knowledge and formal measures of coherence, with much more besides.

In this paper I will ignore most of these topics, and just trace some parts of the history of two ideas about belief whose current interaction may lead to future progress. One idea is the idea of belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment as a meaningful tripartite...


Modal Logic Belief Revision Justify Belief Belief Core Credence Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA

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