Abstract
The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small models and hence that its ontological commitments—and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory—are minimal.
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Menzel, C., Zalta, E.N. The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory. J Philos Logic 43, 333–363 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9265-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9265-z