Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 43, Issue 2–3, pp 283–302

Defeasible Conditionalization

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-012-9263-1

Cite this article as:
Thorn, P.D. J Philos Logic (2014) 43: 283. doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9263-1
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Abstract

The applicability of Bayesian conditionalization in setting one’s posterior probability for a proposition, α, is limited to cases where the value of a corresponding prior probability, PPRI(α|∧E), is available, where ∧E represents one’s complete body of evidence. In order to extend probability updating to cases where the prior probabilities needed for Bayesian conditionalization are unavailable, I introduce an inference schema, defeasible conditionalization, which allows one to update one’s personal probability in a proposition by conditioning on a proposition that represents a proper subset of one’s complete body of evidence. While defeasible conditionalization has wider applicability than standard Bayesian conditionalization (since it may be used when the value of a relevant prior probability, PPRI(α|∧E), is unavailable), there are circumstances under which some instances of defeasible conditionalization are unreasonable. To address this difficulty, I outline the conditions under which instances of defeasible conditionalization are defeated. To conclude the article, I suggest that the prescriptions of direct inference and statistical induction can be encoded within the proposed system of probability updating, by the selection of intuitively reasonable prior probabilities.

Keywords

Conditionalization Probability updating Principle of total evidence Defeasible inference Direct inference Induction 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophisches InstitutUniversity of DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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